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Abstract 
The proper definition of the concept of ‘disorder’ could resolve the existing issues in 
psychiatry today. Christopher Boorse and R.E. Kendell, as proponents of the medical model, 
aim at defining the concept in scientific and value-free terms. K.W.M. Fulford develops the 
fact-plus-value model which integrates the factual and evaluative elements. John Z. Sadler 
applies the Fulfordian account to diagnostic manuals to resolve their inconsistencies. I find 
Fulford’s initial and later arguments incongruent. His account is also too evaluative given the 
absence of any restrictions on the place and role of values. Furthermore, it is relatively easy 
to conclude that given the prominent position of values, facts need not exist as they are 
essentially evaluative terms with merely an overt factual connotation. Moreover, values 
provide the benchmark against which facts are assessed (for their degree of value-ladenness) 
and identified; and this makes facts dependent on and a subclass of values.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
One of the most fundamental questions in the domain of philosophy of psychiatry is 
concerning the definition of the concept of ‘disorder’ and its synonymously-used 
counterparts, ‘dysfunction’, ‘disease’, and ‘illness’. What is a ‘disorder’ and what exactly 
distinguishes it from these other terms? The answer has been provided by an array of 
theories, the most notable of which are offered by the ‘medical’ and the ‘fact-plus-value’ 
models. In what follows, I will briefly introduce views of the two camps and then provide a 
short summary of my position on the topic. This chapter will end with an overview of the 
forthcoming chapters. 
As a proponent of the medical model, Christopher Boorse defends the idea of defining 
‘disorder’ in factual and value-free terms. To this end, he proposes distinguishing between 
the two senses of ‘health’, one in opposition to ‘disease’ and the other to ‘illness’. For him, 
the former represents the ‘theoretical’ and the latter, the “practical or mixed ethical”1 sense of 
the term in question. Boorse rejects the credibility of the concept of ‘health’ in practical terms 
since it depends upon the norms and moral evaluations at play in the contexts considered. The 
‘theoretical’ concept, on the other hand, enjoys a scientific basis rooted in biology and is 
equally applicable to organisms of all species. In view of its solid basis and broader range of 
applicability, Boorse classifies ‘illnesses’ as a subclass of ‘diseases’.2  
He considers the state of normality as being assessable on the basis of its 
correspondence to the natural condition of an organism. Subsequently, ‘health’ can be 
determined in view of the degree of conformity of functioning to the ‘species-specific natural 
                                                          
1Christopher Boorse, “On the Distinction between Disease and Illness,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 5, no.1 
(Autumn 1975): 56. 
2 Ibid., 57-58. 
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design’. Hence, the ‘natural function’ of a species is its “standard causal contribution”3 to the 
pursuit of a goal by an organism. The ultimate goal of any given species is promotion of 
survival and reproduction. Physiological functions can subsequently be defined as specific 
factors that contribute to fulfillment of these goals.4 Consequently, ‘diseases’ are defined as 
interruptions in and interferences with at least one particular function of a given species.5 
Furthermore, he argues that ‘health’ is to be evaluated on the basis of proper 
functioning of an organism’s parts. The function of a part is defined as its “causal 
contribution to empirically given goals”6. Given that the goals and their manner of pursuit 
can be identified independently of all value-considerations, he claims that a part’s ‘function’ 
and ‘goals’ must be defined in ‘value-free’ terms. 7  Accordingly, Boorse proposes an 
‘evolutionary’ account of ‘disorder’ by pointing to its role in reducing ‘survival and 
reproductive’ capacities. By referring to this reduction and through usage of the notion of 
‘evolutionary dysfunction’, he offers a value-free definition of ‘disorder’ as ‘functional 
incapacity’ – or in his own words – as “deficiencies in the functional efficiency of the 
body”8.9  
For Boorse, ‘illnesses’ have a negative connotation built into them. Given the 
evaluative nature of ‘illnesses’, he specifies three conditions that must be fulfilled by 
‘diseases’ in order to qualify as ‘illnesses’. Generally, they must be incapacitating-enough to: 
first, be undesirable for the afflicted; second, entitle one to “special treatment”10; and third, 
                                                          
3 Christopher Boorse, “On the Distinction between Disease and Illness,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 5, no.1 
(Autumn 1975): 57. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 58. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 59. 
9 Ibid., 58-59. 
10 Ibid., 66. 
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provide the afflicted with a ‘valid excuse’ for their ‘normally criticisable’ behavior.11 Boorse 
holds that while these conditions must be ‘automatically’ applied to “serious physical 
diseases” 12 , they are especially inapplicable to ‘serious mental diseases’ (other than 
psychoses and neurosis).13 
R.E. Kendell supports the authenticity of ‘mental illnesses’. His model (which can be 
viewed as a modified version of Boorse’s) argues against the possibility of developing a clear 
definition of the term.14 Briefly put, he mentions several definitions, from ‘a condition that 
requires treatment’ to ‘lesions with some structural damage’. He argues that each of these 
definitions is subject to inevitable and intolerable consequences and on that basis must be 
rejected. For the sake of brevity, I will only focus on the more relevant argument, that of the 
statistical concept of disease.15  
Cohen initially defined the concept of disease in statistical (but vague) terms as 
“deviations from the normal ... by way of excess or defect”16. Scadding narrowed it down to 
exclude non-medically significant deviations from the normal. The distinction, he argued, 
could be made once the question about whether the particular abnormality has or has not 
placed the afflicted at a ‘biological disadvantage’ is settled. If it has, then it qualifies as a 
form of disease; otherwise, it does not. Kendell takes on the idea of ‘biological disadvantage’ 
and translates it as the sum of ‘increased mortality’ and ‘reduced fertility’.17  
                                                          
11 Christopher Boorse, “On the Distinction between Disease and Illness,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 5, no.1 
(Autumn 1975): 66. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 R.E. Kendell, “The Concept of Disease and its Implications for Psychiatry,” The British Journal of Psychiatry 
127, (October 1975): 305-6. 
15 Ibid., 307-8. 
16 Ibid., 309. 
17 Ibid., 310. 
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K. W. M. (Bill) Fulford refers to Boorse’s use of evaluative terms in defining 
‘disease’ as “deficiencies in the functional efficiency”18 and its causes being mainly due to a 
“hostile environment”19 and argues that his inability at defining the concept in entirely value-
free terms signals existence of an essential and undeniable element in the connotation of 
‘disease’. Therefore, irrespective of their place of use, whether in ‘medical theory’ or 
‘medical practice’, the concept is in effect, value-laden.20 
Fulford holds that value-terms can be replaced by descriptive notions in three 
different senses: first, descriptions of values may be replaced by values; second, value-terms 
could be replaced by equivocal terms; and third, they could be defined by “reference to the 
descriptive criteria for the value judgments they express”21. The first describes the Humean 
non-descriptivist’s position which assumes that no value-laden terms could be analyzed into 
or defined in terms of factual statements alone.22 The third reflects ‘descriptivism’ which 
permits re-defining value-terms through factual descriptions.23 This is essentially Boorse’s 
position when he claims that value-laden terms such as ‘disease’ can be defined in purely 
factual terms but ends up with an evaluative definition.24 
Despite the fact that descriptivism can rid the Boorsian account of its inconsistencies 
in analysis, he denies being a descriptivist on ‘disease’. The inconsistencies are evident in his 
movements back and forth between ‘factual’ and ‘evaluative’ connotations, failure to account 
for cases of illness when one cannot be said to be diseased (the case of a hangover), and lack 
of a proper distinction between illness and disturbance in functioning (by labelling 
                                                          
18 K.W.M. (Bill) Fulford, “What is (Mental) Disease? An Open Letter to Christopher Boorse,” Journal of 
Medical Ethics 27, no. 2 (April 2001): 81. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 K.W.M. (Bill) Fulford, Moral Theory and Medical Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
36. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 37. 
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individuals who are ill as not being ‘functioning’ properly).25 However, descriptivism is a 
problematic position given that its openness in regards to redefining values in ‘factual’ terms 
is not available in psychiatry in light of the diversity in human values (in the sense of beliefs, 
desires, emotions and etcetera).26  
Consequently, Boorse aims at defining ‘function’ in value-free terms. Fulford rejects 
the credibility of this stance since the teleological (i.e. goal-oriented) nature of ‘function’ 
links it with ‘purposes and values’.27 Therefore, while it is reasonable for naturalists (such as 
Boorse) to take ‘value-free’ as ‘teleology-free’, naturalists aim at reducing the ‘teleological’ 
explanation to a ‘causal’ one.28 Boorse maintains the ‘teleological’ aspect of ‘goal’ and offers 
a value and ‘teleology-free’ definition for ‘function’ as the “standard causal contribution to a 
goal actually pursued by the organism” 29 . 30  Fulford identifies two problems with this 
definition: the general difficulty is concerning the concept of goal being inherently evaluative 
in meaning given that a goal is “good to hit and bad to miss”31 and the specific difficulty is 
regarding the inapplicability of ‘function’ (as part-function) to ‘mental disorders’ since these 
involve the person as a whole and not individual organs and systems.32  
Fulford, as a proponent of the fact-plus-value model proposes inclusion of values in 
the definition of the concept of ‘disorder’. To distinguish between ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ 
disorders, he adopts Richard Hare’s point that ‘any value term’ can under certain conditions 
                                                          
25 K.W.M. (Bill) Fulford, Moral Theory and Medical Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, 
31-32. 
26 K.W.M. (Bill) Fulford, “What is (Mental) Disease? An Open Letter to Christopher Boorse,” Journal of 
Medical Ethics 27, no. 2 (April 2001): 82. 
27 Ibid., 83. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
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have a ‘factual meaning’.33 In fact, he thinks that there is no reason why ‘disease’ and ‘bodily 
disorder’ despite being used with largely factual connotations should not be value terms. 
Therefore, if ‘disorder’ is taken as a value-term, the difference in the case of ‘physical’ and 
‘mental’ disorders would lie in their respective connotations. While the former enjoys a 
‘factual’ connotation, the latter is assigned an ‘evaluative’ meaning. ‘Mental disorders’, by 
the same token, can be said to be more value-laden than ‘physical disorders’.34  
Subsequently, he provides an analogy for the case of mental and physical disorders. 
He explains that just as there is a consensus on what features a ‘good’ strawberry must have, 
there is a common understanding of the ‘factual’ elements of ‘bodily disorders’. ‘Mental 
disorders’, on the other hand, can be compared to the concept of a ‘good’ picture in the sense 
that there is no general agreement on the characteristics a picture must possess to qualify as a 
‘good’ picture. Granted that ‘bodily disorders’ are better explained by ‘factual’ connotations, 
it is undeniable that ‘mental disorders’ (given the existing diversity in individual values (i.e. 
experiences and behaviour)) are more sufficiently explained by value-laden connotations.35 
Sadler adopts the Fulfordian ‘fact-plus-value’ model of ‘disease’. He, too, insists that 
‘disorder’ could not be defined in purely ‘factual’ or value-free terms. He describes ‘values’ 
as being ‘part of an assumed (sub)-culture in the sense that they vary on a continuum, could 
be the inherent or intrinsic property of entities, and are essentially diverse and influential’. 
Thus, Sadler describes values as ‘concepts’ that “guide our actions, lead us to be deserving of 
praise or blame, and are assumed, to greater and lesser degree, in just about any everyday 
activity”36.37 Sadler focuses on the use of values as descriptions and argues that in ‘the apple 
                                                          
33  K.W.M. (Bill) Fulford, “Values, Science, and Psychiatry” in Psychiatric Ethics, ed. Sidney Bloch and 
Stephen A. Green (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) , 69. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 69-71. 
36 John Z. Sadler, Values and Psychiatric Diagnosis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 9. 
37 Ibid. 
7 
 
is red and good’, ‘red’ and ‘good’ are both predicates, and while the former is a ‘factual’ and 
‘objective’ predicate about the apple, the latter is a ‘subjective’ ‘value-predicate’ which 
reflects a value-judgement.38  
Sadler believes that the DSM (i.e. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders) is a good means of providing clinicians with ‘denotations’ or a catalogue of 
categories while essentially lacking a viable method or technique to characterize and promote 
an appropriate diagnostic practice. 39  Furthermore, he finds DSM to be a user-friendly 
document which gives the reader the wrong impression of being usable just by anyone.40 
Sadler states that apart from being a diagnostic manual, DSMs must be capable of providing 
practitioners with knowledge of how to be clinicians and how to employ the tools available at 
their disposal. This entails that DSMs must be more than a diagnostic catalogue by including 
the crucial evaluative factors that shape and modify treatment modalities. Put differently, 
DSMs must not only be concerned with the theoretical aspect of diagnosis but they must also 
bring in and employ the practical values-based considerations in making a diagnosis.41 
Fulford does not seem able to put a cap on values (as used in regards to concepts) or 
explain where they tend to be dominant and where they cease to be. This is a problem in the 
sense that we would end up in a situation where we would have to label every term a value 
term (including those we previously deemed factual) and instead consider these as being 
value-laden in nature with less evaluative content and force and with merely overt factual 
connotations. A possible consequence of his view is that although there would be terms that 
are entirely value-laden, none can be entirely factual. Furthermore, he argues that VBM (i.e. 
Values-Based Medicine) complements and in no way replaces EBM (or Evidence-Based 
                                                          
38 John Z. Sadler, Values and Psychiatric Diagnosis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 9. 
39 Ibid., 418. 
40 Ibid., 418-419.  
41 Ibid., 419.  
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Medicine); under his model, however, this view becomes suspect. In fact, if values enjoy the 
dominance that he assigns to them, that is, in every concept, every diagnosis, and every 
decision-making process, then he must be, at minimum, willing to assign a sort of priority to 
VBM if not completely place EBM under the heading of VBM. After all, VBM includes 
matters related to both the theory and practice and its comprehensiveness necessitates a 
modification in the significance assigned to EBM.  
Therefore, I think that keeping EBM and VBM as parallels underestimates the 
dominance of values that Fulford himself wishes to raise awareness of. To ensure 
consistency, I am of the opinion that, he must specify a hierarchical relationship where EBM 
would merely occupy a limited space within the boundaries of a general heading of VBM. 
Then, it does not seem unforeseeable that his model would implicitly place psychiatry at the 
tip of the medical profession’s pyramid with all other specialties of medicine beneath it. He 
could then argue for the ‘practical’ priority of psychiatry since it can better accommodate 
VBM and also since inclusion of VBM does not automatically exclude or eliminate the space 
for inclusion of EBM (this enables psychiatry to act like a module under which other areas of 
medicine could be classified in accordance with their degree of dependence on values). 
Irrespective of where the actual place of psychiatry in the medical domain is, I reject the 
credibility of the hierarchical model of medicine and plan to argue that the Fulfordian fact-
plus-value model of ‘disorder’ must be, at best, modified to fit his later views on VBM and 
EBM. Such a change would be a major shift and I am uncertain as to whether the revised 
account would qualify as a viable response to the Kendellian sort of worries. 
Therefore, the two segments of his theory, that is, his book on the model of ‘disorder’ 
and his later articles on VBM, can be viewed as offering conflicting views of the author. 
However, one might argue that the term ‘values’ (as used in the two sections) differs for 
Fulford in his theoretical and practical arguments; while the former kind is subjective in 
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relation to the world, the latter is subjective in relation to the subjects themselves and the 
confusion arises due to non-recognition of this difference. I will argue for this interpretation 
and further claim that making such a distinction would only create a phenomenological gap 
between the two kinds of ‘values’ which would subsequently lead to further complexities in 
clinical practice and in particular in respect to patients suffering from anosognosia. 
Sadler’s account is similarly too dependent on values. He believes that the key to a 
proper understanding of mental disorders is consideration of values and their inclusion in 
nosology, diagnosis and decision making processes. Although it is undeniable that values 
form an integral part of clinical practice, I wonder whether we would be leaving them too 
much room by allowing them to play a part in both the theory and practice. I am of the 
opinion that we need to adopt a more neutral stance towards values and that despite their 
minimal role in the current nosology, we must try to restrict their usage to the limits of ethical 
clinical practice. Of course, there will never be any clear-cut boundaries but I tend to think 
that granting values the authority to influence the nosology brings about a sort of relativity in 
the classification of mental disorders that cannot be remedied. Although the nosology would 
then cover the region-specific disorders, accepting such relativity could potentially open the 
door to abuse and history has proven that psychiatry can be used as a political weapon against 
the dissidents.  
As a final remark, this thesis will unfold as follows: 
• Chapter 2 will introduce the ‘medical’ models of Boorse and Kendell. It will also be 
dedicated to pinpointing the similarities between the two views and highlighting the 
controversial key points later rejected by others. 
10 
 
• Chapter 3 will consider the ‘fact-plus-value’ model of Fulford and Sadler’s 
application of the model to the practical side of psychiatry. Furthermore, Fulford’s 
criticism of Boorse will be briefly looked at. 
• Chapter 4 will comprise of my commentary and an in-depth critical evaluation of the 
‘fact-plus-value’ model. It will include a discussion of worries and possible solutions 
and will end with my concluding remarks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Chapter 2: The Medical Model 
In an article called “On the Distinction between Disease and Illness”, Christopher 
Boorse advocates the possibility of having a value-free and purely-factual account of ‘health’. 
He believes that our present difficulty with properly defining the concept in question stems 
from our failure to distinguish between the two senses in which this concept can be 
understood. While ‘health’ can be defined as in opposition to ‘disease’, it could also be 
defined as in opposition to ‘illness’. ‘Disease’ and ‘illness’ are distinct in that the former 
makes reference to the scientific, value-free, factual, and theoretical basis of a given malady 
and the latter involves the normative, value-laden, and practical side.42 
He argues that defining ‘health’ in the second sense and as a state of ‘normality’ is 
problematic since the definition would be variable and dependent upon context-specific 
description of norms and moral evaluations. This standpoint is commonly referred to as 
‘normativism’. Boorse distinguishes between two forms of normativism (i.e. strong and 
weak) and claims that neither position can be maintained. Under the strong version, 
judgments of health are considered to be purely evaluative and devoid of any descriptive 
content. In other words, strong normativism claims that for a condition to be unhealthy it is 
both necessary and sufficient that it be bad. Boorse rejects this position by mentioning some 
undesirable conditions that are not diseases, such as having a Jewish nose or being 
moderately ugly.43 
However, under the weak account, judgments of health are evaluative by virtue of 
satisfying some further descriptive criteria (in addition to the normative ones). Put differently, 
‘healthy’ is a concept comprised of normative and descriptive components. To rebut, Boorse 
                                                          
42 Christopher Boorse, “On the Distinction between Disease and Illness,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 5, no.1 
(Autumn 1975): 49-50. 
43 Ibid., 50-52. 
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refers to some counterexamples within physical medicine, such as the desirable mild 
infection contracted post-immunization. Even if the undesirability of conditions is deemed a 
necessary precursor for being labelled as diseases, he contends that the criterion to fulfill 
remains ambiguous. He mentions infertility as an example and argues that in the absence of 
considerations about its reproductive effects on humans over generations, it is not clear 
whether the condition is desirable or undesirable.44 
Subsequently, Boorse points to biologists’ use of ‘disease’ in reference to plants and 
animals. Just as they employ the term without bringing in any normative assessments of its 
desirability, he thinks that ‘health’ in regards to persons must equally be defined in value-free 
terms. Furthermore, given that the theoretical sense of ‘health’ is based upon biological facts 
(in contrast to practical norms) and since the term so defined has a broader spectrum of 
applicability (in view of its equal application to members of all species), Boorse argues that 
‘illnesses’ are essentially a ‘subclass’ of ‘diseases’. From the above, he concludes that 
‘health’ can only be properly defined in terms of the sciences, theories, and facts.45 
To define the theoretical sense of ‘health’, he introduces C. Daly King’s definition of 
‘clinical normality’. King asserts that “the normal ... is objectively, and properly, to be 
defined as that which functions in accordance with its design”46. Accordingly, Boorse states 
that “the normal is the natural”47 and that to be theoretically-healthy, an organism’s level of 
functioning must conform to its species-specific natural design. To identify and determine 
the natural biological design of an organism, one needs knowledge of the organism’s natural 
function which in biological terms is “the standard causal contribution to a goal actually 
                                                          
44 Christopher Boorse, “On the Distinction between Disease and Illness,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 5, no.1 
(Autumn 1975): 53. 
45 Ibid., 56. 
46 Ibid., 57. 
47 Ibid. 
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pursued by the organism”48. As I will later discuss in detail, it is important to note that Boorse 
believes in the existence of natural mental function and that he deems any deviation from 
such functioning as a form of a ‘disorder’.49 He quickly notes the two universal physiological 
goals of all species, namely survival and reproduction. Taken together, he argues that to be 
considered ‘healthy’, an organism’s mode of functioning must accord to its particular natural 
biological functions which consistently promote these goals.50 
Consequently, ‘disease’ can be defined as a state in which an organism experiences a 
disruption in or interference with one or more natural functions typical of its own species. 
Given that to be ‘healthy’ each and every part of an organism must be functioning properly, 
he argues that functionality of an organism must be assessed at the level of its parts and not 
the individual as a whole. The function of a part can then be defined as its causal role in 
pursuit of the empirically-set goals of survival and reproduction. Since these goals and 
functions can be determined in isolation and without incorporating any value-laden 
considerations of their pursuit, the concept of ‘health’ in its theoretical sense must also be 
defined as an equally value-free notion.51 
Subsequently, Boorse endorses this statistical account of King and to avoid the earlier 
objections made to normativism, he re-introduces the idea of ‘natural design’. To this point, 
‘disease’, in his own words, is defined as some form of deviation from the ‘natural functional 
organization of a given species’. It is worthwhile to note that he defines ‘deviation’ as any 
form of disorganization that is not part of the natural design of the species in question. This 
means that for him any incongruity between the species-specific natural design and the 
particular condition which results in a variation of (and reduction in) functioning of the 
                                                          
48 Christopher Boorse, “On the Distinction between Disease and Illness,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 5, no.1 
(Autumn 1975): 57. 
49 Ibid., 63. 
50 Ibid., 56-57. 
51 Ibid., 58. 
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particular species qualifies as a deviation. As a result, conditions we are inclined to call 
‘diseases’ but not ‘illnesses’, such as tooth decay, constitute ‘diseases’ by virtue of the fact 
that they are not part of the natural organization of a species and are rather caused by 
environmental factors. This leads him to define ‘disease’ as unnatural or atypical 
“deficiencies in the functional efficiency of the body” 52 that can also be the result of a 
‘hostile’ environment. Therefore, a ‘disorder’ can be viewed as a condition that results in a 
reduction in one’s capacity to attain the two ultimate evolutionary goals of survival and 
reproduction. Therefore, in value-free terms, a ‘disorder’ is equated with a form of 
‘functional incapacity’.53 
He provides two reasons for the desirability of functional normality in physical 
medicine. First, people do find it worthwhile to pursue the goals that physiological functions 
promote, and second, such functions attend to all types of activities indifferently. As a result, 
the desirability of particular physiological functions would not be variable or undergo 
changes on the basis of one’s chosen ends. Hence, the desirability of ‘health’ would merely 
have an instrumental (and not intrinsic) value. As such, the value of ‘health’ would be 
proportional to the degree it can secure and further those goals.54  
Contrary to the theoretical sense of ‘health’, the practical sense of the term is 
embedded with value-driven considerations. Boorse argues that there is a negative 
connotation built into the term ‘illness’. He compares ‘disease’ and ‘illness’ with ‘low 
intelligence’ and ‘stupidity’ and explains that there are instances in which intelligence loses 
its commonly-assigned desirability such as when an employer hires someone for a basic job 
such as washing the dishes. In this scenario, a person of low intelligence can be equally 
                                                          
52 Christopher Boorse, “On the Distinction between Disease and Illness,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 5, no.1 
(Autumn 1975): 59. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., 60-61. 
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qualified as one of high intelligence and the virtue of ‘intelligence’ loses its assigned value. 
Within this context, the less intelligent person cannot be deemed ‘stupid’. There are also 
cases where ‘disease’ is desirable, such as alcohol intoxication or post-immunization 
infection. The persons experiencing these conditions are not ‘ill’ even though they have a 
form of ‘disease’.55 
Therefore, Boorse argues that to qualify as an ‘illness’, a ‘disease’ must be serious 
enough to result in some form of incapacity and additionally, it must be: 
i. “undesirable for its bearer; 
ii. a title to special treatment; and 
iii. a valid excuse for normally criticisable behavior”56.57 
As the above conditions clarify, Boorse does not deem the term ‘illness’ as being 
applicable to plants and animals. After all, he explains that biologists do not evaluate the 
diseases in plants and animals as undesirable particularly since they have no personal 
interests in their health. Just as there is no sense in arguing for the interests of a ‘begonia’, he 
thinks that we must avoid using ‘illness’ in regards to plants and animals.58  
Subsequently, he assumes that there are ‘natural mental functions’ and that 
psychopathology is an ‘unnatural interference with these functions’. He explains that, 
contrary to physiological states, mental states are not ‘neutral’ in respect to the choice of 
actions.59 He thinks that desires are to serve a motivational function in promoting action-
taking and as a result, they may or may not accord to the species’ design. Lacking a suitable 
                                                          
55 Christopher Boorse, “On the Distinction between Disease and Illness,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 5, no.1 
(Autumn 1975): 61. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., 53. 
59 Ibid., 62. 
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reason for demanding such conformity, he is left with what he regards as a form of ‘disease’ 
which is not an ‘illness’. He takes the example of homosexuality and argues that given its 
deviance from normal sexual function (which is reproduction), it meets the criterion of being 
a ‘disease’.60  
In respect to the second condition and given the fact that illnesses are serious diseases 
that reduce functioning at the level of ‘gross behavior’, it is possible for everyone to be 
diseased without being ill. Under Boorse’s account, statistically normal conditions could be 
diseases only if they are caused by the environment. Some may argue that cultural 
environments can negatively affect children and cause ‘diseases’. However, he thinks that 
empirical support for this hypothesis is needed and further argues that even if proven true, 
one can still maintain the idea that ‘only serious diseases can be illnesses’ by abandoning the 
presupposition that ‘not everyone can be ill’.61 
The third condition for a ‘disease’ to be an ‘illness’ poses a difficulty, namely that 
while excusing conduct on the basis of ‘disease’ in physical ailments depends upon the 
relation of patients to their own bodies, in case of mental conditions such a relationship must 
be maintained with one’s psychology which involves an activity with the “very seat of 
responsibility – the mind and character”62. The problem with mental disorders lies in the fact 
that it is persons that are held legally liable and not their personalities or character traits. In 
holding one responsible, the person must be conscious of their actions and their implications. 
In some mental disorders, such as neurosis and psychoses, the afflicted lacks a conscious 
awareness of the consequences of their actions. Although excusing conduct of such persons 
seems justified, Boorse thinks that the test of consciousness is inadequate since the actions 
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are still our actions. This issue is better demonstrated in the case of character disorders since 
the unhealthy condition is embedded within the realm of their consciousness and as such, 
their conducts cannot be justifiably excused. 63  From this he concludes that actions and 
behaviors when produced under the influence of mental diseases are totally inexcusable.64 
Furthermore, he claims that while the three aforementioned conditions are to be routinely 
applied to serious physical diseases, none should be assumed as being routinely applicable to 
serious mental diseases. In fact, he argues that the term ‘mental illness’ must only be used in 
reference to psychoses and neurosis.65 
He explains that the implications of the above argument support two conclusions. Of 
these, only the second is of significance to our purposes here and will be discussed in detail. 
The second implication is ‘twofold’:  
a) The claim that health professionals disapprove of what is ‘ipso facto unhealthy’ 
is unfounded. The society cannot arrange and modify the functional settings of 
members of a given species and as a result can never have an absolute authority 
on either ‘disease’ or ‘illness’66 and,  
b) Unless the argument for desirability of ‘health’ is questioned, its force 
undergoes ‘inflation’. After all, the value of ‘health’ is to be set in accordance 
with the ‘value of conformity’ to the species-specific design.67 
R.E. Kendell is a proponent of the existence of ‘mental illnesses’. His model, as a 
variant of the Boorsian account, rejects the existence of a clear definition of the term.68 He 
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acknowledges that no clear-cut definition of ‘illness’ with the capacity of marking out non-
pathological conditions, such as ‘delivery of babies or circumcision of infants’, exists. The 
problem can be traced back to medicine’s reverse identification and classification of diseases. 
As a practical discipline, medicine began by identifying individual diseases and then working 
its way up to grouping clusters of disorders and in the end seeking to develop a proper 
definition of the term in question. The overlap in the boundaries of diseases and the 
variability in definition of constituents of ‘disease’ and ‘health’ by context are the reasons 
that make arrival at a unified definition all too difficult.69 
Furthermore, he explains that our ignorance of the ‘essential functions’ of organisms 
in general and human beings in particular (which is rooted in their not being man-made 
entities) contributes a great deal to our inability to define ‘disease’. He argues that plants and 
animals (as species that we are not typically biased about, either emotionally or 
economically) can provide the best means of understanding our very own functions. He 
thinks that we can simply agree that their basic biological functions are to promote survival 
and reproduction. As such, any condition that results in a reduction of a species’ chances of 
meeting these goals could be justifiably called a ‘disease’. He admits of the significant role 
that environmental factors play in producing diseases by pointing to the fact that no species 
could exist in absolute isolation from these elements and that their functioning could not be 
assessed in vacuo.70 
Subsequently, he examines a number of historical accounts of ‘disease’, from the 
‘cause of suffering and injury’ to ‘incapacity to perform’ and the ‘cause of a complaint’. 
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Given the difficulties associated with these viewpoints (one of which, as Kendell explains, is 
the fact that there are some illnesses, the carriers of which neither make a complaint nor 
suffer, such as the case of a man with an undiagnosed and symptomless form of cancer 
developing in his lungs), Kendell denies the credibility of such accounts. For the sake of 
brevity, I will only attend to the more relevant argument, that of the statistical concept of 
disease.71  
Cohen initially defined the concept of disease in statistical (but vague) terms as 
“deviations from the normal ... by way of excess or defect”72. This definition is inadequate 
given that it fails to distinguish between the kinds of deviations; that is, between those that 
are harmful (such as hypertension), neutral (such as ‘great height’), and ‘positively 
beneficial’ (such as high intelligence). Scadding tried to narrow the definition down to 
exclude non-medically significant deviations from the normal. To qualify as a disease, the 
deviation must place the afflicted at a ‘biological disadvantage’ by either reducing their 
chances of survival or reproduction. To be precise, he defines a disease as “the sum of the 
abnormal phenomena displayed by a group of living organisms in association with a specified 
common characteristic or set of characteristics by which they differ from the norm for their 
species in such a way as to place them at a biological disadvantage”73.74 
Kendell identifies multiple implications of this definition. First, it clarifies that a 
deviation in either direction – in excess or defect – can produce disease. Second, it 
demonstrates that the boundary between diseases and health is ‘arbitrary’ just as it is in the 
case of mental subnormality and normality in reference to intelligence. Third, it implies that 
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the majority of people are exempted from being labelled as ‘ill’.75 Nonetheless, he believes 
that Scadding’s definition of ‘disease’ is ambiguous. To demonstrate his point, he mentions 
psoriasis as a condition that (given the suffering it causes and the fact about its being treatable 
by the available medical means), we would want to label as a disease even though it does not 
involve any noticeable ‘biological disadvantages’ or impairments of functioning.76 
In accordance with Boorse, Kendell deems it unnecessary to consider ‘disease’ as a 
value-laden term (or ‘disease judgments’ as ‘value judgments’). He offers an analogy in 
which he compares the assertion: ‘a particular organism is not functioning properly’ with the 
statement: ‘a lawn mower is not functioning properly’ (given that it no longer cuts the grass). 
He claims that so long as the functions of the organ (or organism) under consideration are 
adequately understood, the impairment or failure of function could be easily and confidently 
identified and moreover, the impact of such changes on survival and reproductive capacities 
of the organism could be assessed.77 
Furthermore, he rejects the possibility of ‘disease’ being a value term by claiming that 
if it were so, the question of ‘whether X is a disease’ would be dependent on the way the 
respective culture or those involved in the process viewed it. In that event, a condition would 
qualify as a disease only if it were judged to be undesirable. The concept so defined would be 
unstable in regards to the treatment methods it supports or produces, possibly resulting in 
using a combination of physicians and medical technologies in one society and utilizing 
institutions and medical technologies in another society for an identical form of disease.78 
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Interestingly, Kendell is well-aware of the limitations of his theory, particularly in 
respect to its exclusion of cases one would reasonably wish to include, such as ‘post herpetic 
neuralgia and psoriasis’. These conditions cause considerable suffering, are accompanied by 
lesions, and are treatable by medical means.79 While acknowledging these points, he still 
argues for his own interpretation of the term. He worries that broadening the definition any 
further opens the door to all sorts of misperceptions and that the theory would, as a result, 
lose its credibility and must be rejected. Therefore, when presented with the option of 
defining the concept in narrow or broad terms, he opts for the stricter of the two.80  
At this point it may not be very difficult to see the similarities between the Boorsian 
and Kendellian views. For instance, both theories are scientifically-oriented, with a biological 
undertone and an evolutionary look. Furthermore, both models reject the value-ladenness of 
‘disease’ and also attempt at producing a value-free definition of the concept based on the 
reduction such conditions bring about in the survival and reproductive capacities of 
organisms. Environmental factors are considered as influential elements affecting the 
production of such conditions under both theories. Moreover, under both accounts, 
homosexuality is a ‘disease’. However, while Boorse tries to link it to a form of deviation 
from normal human functioning and natural design in the evolutionary path, Kendell 
associates it to its counter-effects to fertility and reproduction and hence to the biological 
disadvantage that it subjects the individual to.  
In the next chapter, I will look at arguments posited by the second camp, or the 
proponents of the fact-plus-value model. For the time being, I will list the key points of the 
Boorsian account that Fulford is going to challenge. These are: 
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1. Inconsistency in its application when ‘disease’ is defined as some form of 
‘disturbance of bodily functioning’. 
2. Its failure to recognize conditions whose ‘particular disturbance of function’ is 
still unknown, as diseases. 
3. Its faulty assumption regarding our ordinary use of ‘disease’ (and not ‘illness’) of 
plants and animals as the terms are used in respect to persons. 
4. Its failure in specifying a satisfactory logical relationship between ‘disease’ and 
‘illness’ by requiring that all diseases be disturbances of function. 
5. Its misguided classification of ‘illness’ as a subcategory of ‘disease’ and the 
resulting confusion in defining ‘illness’. 
6. Its failure to properly address non-empirical problems that arise in analytical 
research. 
7. Its reference to the teleological aspect of goal and its use in developing a teleology 
and value-free definition of function which subjects the definition to two 
problems, namely general and specific. 
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Chapter 3: The Fact Plus Value Model 
Fulford refers to the difficulties associated with the concept of ‘illness’ and their 
implications for physical and psychological medicine. While both areas of medicine have 
encountered concept-related problems, psychological medicine has faced a greater many 
issues. Historically, ‘mental illness’ was deemed an ambiguous concept (given its value-
ladenness, variability with context, and normative basis) whereas, ‘physical illness’ was 
considered a clear concept (due to its objectivity, solidity, and factual basis). Naturally, the 
problem to be addressed was identified as ‘mental illness’. In order to evaluate the 
genuineness of mental illnesses as real illnesses, the concept of ‘mental illness’ was 
compared to the supposedly-transparent notion of ‘physical illness’ (which was thought to 
represent the ‘genuine’ form of illnesses). Upon close examination and once it was 
discovered that no single, acceptable definition of the ‘mental illness’ could be arrived at, this 
concept was rendered defective.  
In contrast to the classical view, Fulford holds that the ambiguity in meaning and the 
disparity in views that inevitably result from employing the old strategy (namely, some 
arguing for ‘mental illness’ while others oppose it) can be avoided if we come to realize that 
the contradictory positions are directly due to misidentification of the target problem. He 
argues that if the validity of an ambiguous concept, say X, is to be decided by making a 
detailed comparison with a concept that is deemed clear and valid, say Y, and upon making 
the comparison, one ends up deducing radically different and even contradictory conclusions 
about the nature of X, then the problem must lie in the concept used as the benchmark, or Y, 
given that Y is proven to have several possible interpretations and this renders Y unclear. 
Similarly, when proponents of the pro- and anti-psychiatry camps compare ‘mental illness’ to 
the supposedly-clear and valid concept of ‘physical illness’ and end up confirming and 
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rejecting the reality of ‘mental illnesses’ respectively, the problem to be addressed must be 
revised to ‘physical illness’ or that to which the comparison is made. 
Despite this, some might insist that ‘mental illness’ is nonetheless conceptually more 
problematic than ‘physical illness’. To coherently connect these disparate ideas (that is, the 
view that ‘physical illness’ is the problem to be resolved and also that ‘mental illness’ is 
conceptually more troublesome), it may be suggested that we distinguish between difficulties 
in ‘use’ of a concept and difficulties of ‘definition’. Just as we would be mistaken to assume 
that our common use of the concept of ‘time’ is proof of its transparency, we would be wrong 
to conclude that given the absence of conceptual problems in ‘physical illness’, this concept 
is transparent in definition.81  
In the first sense of this argument (that is, in the sense that ‘physical illness’ is 
clinically unproblematic in ‘use’), the second assumption (namely that ‘physical illness’ by 
virtue of being clinically unproblematic is indeed an unproblematic concept) would be fully 
justified.82 However, in the second sense (that is, the sense in which ‘physical illness’ is 
deemed an obscure concept), this notion, contrary to the second assumption, is clinically 
problematic. It is worthy of attention that in both these senses, the concept of ‘mental illness’ 
is clinically problematic. Although making a distinction between difficulties in ‘use’ and of 
‘definition’ allows us to redefine the ‘target problem’ to better cohere to the first assumption 
(or the idea that ‘mental illness’ is the ‘target problem’), it introduces a difficulty related to 
identifying an explanation of the clinically unproblematic use of ‘physical illness’ that is 
based upon a criterion other than the perspicuousness of the concept.83  
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It might be suggested (as a variant of the second assumption) that the unproblematic 
use of ‘physical illness’ is due to the notion’s conceptual soundness notwithstanding its 
possible obscurity. The problem with this third sense is that the conceptual soundness of the 
term cannot just be assumed and furthermore, its clinically unproblematic use cannot be 
presupposed in providing proof for its soundness.84 For example, in the case of a patient 
suffering from classical migraine, the patient’s physical illness is taken for granted while in 
regards to someone with depression, the question of whether the patient is ill remains open to 
debate.85 The fact that illness of patients with migraine is routinely taken for granted suggests 
that physical illnesses are the ‘genuine’ kind of illnesses. If true, they can help us resolve the 
difficulties associated with mental illnesses.86  
On the other hand, Fulford contends that better routes than conventionalism exist that 
do not require the ‘conceptual slide’ from the specific concept of ‘physical illness’ to the 
more general notion of ‘illness’.87 The significance of this proposition is related to a serious 
difficulty with the conventional viewpoint that arises when examples of ‘mental illness’ are 
compared to those of ‘physical illness’. Such a comparison essentially asks whether ‘mental 
illnesses’ are in effect ‘physical illnesses’ and this is directly in tension with the 
conventionalists’ tendency to question if ‘mental illnesses’ are genuine illnesses. The fourth 
sense (as another variant of the second assumption) comes about once ‘physical illnesses’ are 
imagined to constitute ‘real illnesses’ and when one thinks of them as providing the ‘more 
authentic’ examples of ‘illnesses’. It assumes that the clinically unproblematic use of the 
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concept of ‘physical illness’ is owing to the fact that only illnesses of this kind provide 
‘authentic examples’ of ‘illnesses’.88 
While ‘illness’ and ‘physical illness’ are ‘coextensive’ in regards to the maladies that 
they properly apply to,89 Fulford explains that this position is problematic since making a 
distinction between ‘physical’ and ‘mental’ illnesses imply the existence of the more general 
concept of ‘illness’.90 Fulford supports the existence of this general concept and argues that 
‘mental illness’ must only be compared to that and not to ‘physical illness’. In fact, ‘mental 
illness’ must only be directly compared to ‘physical illness’ if the existence of the general 
notion of ‘illness’ is refuted and no argument to this effect has ever been provided by the 
conventionalists. He concludes that there have to be instances of authentic mental illnesses 
(in other words, he claims that the notion of ‘mental illness’ must represent a genuine and 
real form of ‘illness’ in general); otherwise, the concept would be meaningless.91 
Overall, he identifies three difficulties with the two stated assumptions:  
1. Irrespective of how clear the definition of the possible senses of ‘illness’ (i.e. 
‘mental illness’ and ‘physical illness’) are, difficulties in use of these notions 
could still arise.92  
2. If each term has several distinct senses, an ‘illness-diagnosis’ of a given malady 
could be made by reference to any possible combination of these with the 
consequence that a patient suffering from a particular condition could be deemed 
both mentally-ill and not mentally-ill (or physically-ill and not physically-ill). 
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This issue results in a lesser degree of clarity in making a distinction between the 
concepts of ‘mental illness’ and ‘physical illness’.93 
3. If the legitimacy of a patient’s illness is decided based on considerations other 
than the particular features of their condition, the ‘illness-diagnosis’ criteria would 
be even more diverse than the ‘condition-diagnostic opinion’.94 
Consequently, Fulford rejects the validity of the second assumption by arguing 
against consideration of ‘physical illness’ as an unproblematic concept given that it is subject 
to problems in clinical practice when ‘illness-diagnosis’ matters are under consideration.95 
Furthermore, the first assumption must be given up since it assumes that ‘mental illness’ is 
problematic in the three senses in which ‘physical illness’ is unproblematic. These include 
clarity of definition, soundness of the concept, and authenticity of conditions. These are 
supported by the second assumption and their refutation amounts to rejection of the first 
assumption.96 
It is important to note that although clinical difficulties of ‘mental illness’ could lead 
to contradictory ‘illness-diagnosis opinions’, the ‘illness-diagnosis’ problem does not support 
the first assumption since it could be reflecting some feature of the general concept of 
‘illness’ (under which ‘mental illness’, like ‘physical illness’, would provide authentic 
examples of ‘illness’).97 Furthermore, Fulford believes that the value-ladenness, subjectivity, 
vagueness of connotations, and variability of denotations alone do not render ‘mental illness’ 
a defective concept as these may also be features of the notion of ‘illness’.98 He contends that 
by employing the method of linguistic analysis, distortions in our view of each concept 
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considered can be corrected since the method seeks to thoroughly examine the implications 
of the term in question.99  
He begins by distinguishing between ‘illness’, ‘disease’, and ‘dysfunction’. Although 
the first two terms are commonly linked together, only ‘disease’ is typically defined in 
dysfunctional terms and as a condition in which a body or a part of it is not functioning 
properly. Conventionalists treat ‘illness’ and ‘disease’ as synonyms and use a combination of 
the two to refer to ‘disturbance in functioning’. However, despite being ‘closely related’ in 
definition, the three terms are not always logically interchangeable.100 For instance, while 
“He has some awful illness”101 has the same meaning as “He has some awful disease”102, 
there are cases when a patient can be said to have a disease and yet not be ill. For example, a 
diabetic whose condition is well-controlled suffers from the disease diabetes but is not ill.103  
Furthermore, ‘disease’ is sometimes interchangeable with ‘dysfunction’. For instance, 
someone with ‘obstructive airway disease’ basically suffers from a disturbance in their lung 
functioning. In spite of these examples, there are many conditions (such as migraines) that 
cannot be defined in terms of dysfunction of bodily parts. Although this kind of headache 
may have been caused by a disturbance in functioning of a bodily function and it may reduce 
sufferers’ level of functioning, migraine itself cannot be defined in functional terms. 
Therefore, Fulford argues that the proper theory must be able to explain both the synonymous 
and non-synonymous uses of these concepts.104 
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Subsequently, he refers to the shared property of ‘disease’, ‘dysfunction’, and ‘illness’ 
– namely that despite being ‘etymologically’ evaluative, they can be used with ‘mainly 
factual connotations’ in technical contexts.105 Fulford observes that in the analytic philosophy 
of R.M. Hare (among others), there exists an argument in favor of the view that “all value 
terms may under certain circumstances, be used with clear factual meaning”106. This is in fact 
a property of all value terms and is not a unique feature of medical terms. He proceeds with 
an analogy. While we commonly treat terms such as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ as having an evaluative 
meaning when used of, say ‘pictures’, they entail a rather descriptive or factual connotation 
once their referent is, say ‘apples’.107  
To be precise, the case of apples is different in that one can point to an objective and 
pre-determined guideline that everyone can agree on for distinguishing ‘good apples’ from 
‘bad’ ones. In the case of pictures, however, no such shared consensus can exist as each 
person has a unique psychological makeup which consists of variations in constituents of 
what they deem to be ‘good’ or ‘bad’. As a result, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ can have differing 
connotations in different contexts. From this, Fulford concludes that since all value terms can 
under certain conditions have descriptive meanings, the terms in question (i.e. ‘disease’ and 
‘physical illness’), despite being dominantly used with factual meaning, can in fact be value 
terms.108 
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Subsequently, Fulford considers the “variations with context in the factual and 
evaluative connotations of value terms” 109  a significant property of value-laden terms 
‘illness’, ‘disease’, and ‘dysfunction’. More importantly, he argues that variations in the 
criteria of value terms are representative of a psychological fact. That is, the criteria of the 
value term ‘good’, as used of apples, are (despite the possible variations) more settled than 
that of the same term as used of pictures. Therefore, given their clarity, the descriptive 
meanings expressed by some value terms are more ‘prominent’ than others. Consequently, 
the strength of the descriptive meanings of value terms will be contextually variable.110 
Subsequently, Fulford asserts that ‘mental illness’ and ‘physical illness’ are 
conceptually similar in that they are ‘subspecies’ of the general concept of ‘illness’. Once 
‘illness’ is viewed as their constant and shared feature, the difference between the two 
concepts would lie in the “properties of their respective constituents”111 – that is, emotions, 
beliefs, and the like in regards to ‘mental illness’ and feelings and sensations in the case of 
‘physical illness’. By considering the two kinds of properties of such constituents – namely, 
‘empirical and evaluative’ – he then argues that differences between the empirical properties 
of physical and mental illnesses lead to differences in the ‘disease categories’ of physical and 
psychological medicine.112 
In comparison to ‘physical illness’, constituents of ‘mental illness’ lack the empirical 
properties for the development of disease categories, are clinically used with less reliability, 
and are identified in terms of symptoms or cluster of symptoms (rather than being organized 
on the basis of underlying causes). He notes an exception to this rule, namely, ‘cognitive 
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phenomena’, (such as “defects in memory, attention and intellect” 113) which provide an 
example of the variety of ‘mental illness constituents’ with empirical properties quite similar 
to those of ‘physical illness constituents’. Consequently, ‘mental illnesses’ that are 
constituted by cognitive phenomena (such as amnesias and dementias) are conceptually 
closer to ‘physical illnesses’ (than ‘mental illnesses’) and are accordingly easier to reliably 
diagnose, categorize, and understand causes of.114 
Despite our ignorance of the precise changes that are made in brain functions, 
cognitive disorders are caused by known aetiological agents such as toxins, chemicals, and 
traumas. This feature makes their categorization into more specific disease categories 
possible.115 Since these categories are routinely used in clinical settings and in regards to 
physical medicine, the concept of ‘disease’ is almost as prominently used to refer to cognitive 
disorders as it is employed in physical medicine. Hence, the empirical properties of illness 
constituents are roughly correlated with the conceptual properties of their constituted 
illnesses implying that the latter is affected by the former, although there must be other 
sources affecting the latter as well.116  
He offers three reasons for this claim:  
1. The extent of the differences between constituents of ‘mental illness’ and those of 
‘physical illness’ (in view of their empirical properties) is not adequately large to 
account for the degree of the conceptual differences that exist between ‘mental 
illness’ and ‘physical illness’. That is, although the constituents of ‘mental illness’ 
are hard to identify, they may nonetheless be reliably identified. Additionally, the 
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reliability of the constituents of ‘physical illness’ and the ‘bodily signs’ and 
‘radiological’ and ‘biochemical’ test results are often on a par with that reported 
for constituents of ‘mental illness’. Moreover, symptom-based categories are a 
‘necessary precursor’ to causal disease categories and in psychological medicine, 
they have significant implications for ‘prognosis and treatment’; it is also possible 
that progress made in the area of brain science could potentially provide for the 
shift from ‘symptomatic to causal disease categories’ in psychological medicine in 
the future (similar to the one made in ‘physical medicine’).117 
2. The rough correlation just noted holds in cases of ‘large clinical groups’ and falls 
apart upon detailed analysis. The conceptual difficulties that arise in clinical 
settings appear to be prominently in the area of psychological medicine where 
evidence-related empirical issues are better addressed. That is, in psychological 
medicine, the patient’s overall condition is not relevant and it is the subject’s 
response to certain impulses and their beliefs (which lead to anxiety or depression 
of the individual) that must be used to determine the conceptual status of their 
condition as an ‘illness’.118  
3. The last reason is related to ‘variability of’ and ‘difference in’ strength of the 
evaluative connotations whose relevance to the empirical properties of the illness 
constituted might seem obscure. This is mainly due to the more value-laden 
questions that tend to arise in cases of ‘mental illness’ and is also a result of the 
particular and distinct way that values enter the picture of a mental illness 
diagnosis in contrast to that of physical illness.119 
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To demonstrate the point, he compares ‘anxiety’ as a common constituent of ‘mental 
illness’ with ‘pain’ as a typical constituent of ‘physical illness’. Just as the criteria of 
evaluation differ in cases of ‘anxiety’ and ‘pain’, the kinds of such evaluations and their 
extent vary for each condition. For instance, while ‘anxiety’ can be evaluated both negatively 
and positively (an example of the latter is the thrill experienced while participating in 
dangerous sports), ‘pain’ can only be weighed negatively. It is important to emphasize that 
variation of ‘pain’ and ‘anxiety’ differ in proportion to their intensity for the experiencing 
subject and it is wider in the case of ‘anxiety’ as its criteria of evaluation are less settled than 
those of ‘pain’. The example clarifies that if ‘illness’ is considered as an evaluative notion, it 
will be more marked evaluatively when employed for ‘anxiety’ rather than ‘pain’.120 
Furthermore, if ‘illness’ confers a negative value judgment and if the criteria for 
expressing ‘anxiety’ are less settled, then it becomes clear that judgments of ‘illness’ in 
regards to cases of ‘anxiety’ would be more value-laden than instances of ‘pain’. He argues 
that, by extension, similarity of ‘mental illness constituents’ to ‘anxiety’ and ‘physical illness 
constituents’ to ‘pain’ entails that judgments about constituents of the former (or judgments 
that determine ‘mental illness’ of subjects) will more likely result in questions of value than 
judgments of ‘physical illness’. Likewise, the diagnosis of ‘mental illness’ will be more 
evaluative and its evaluative connotations will be more marked in clinical practice in 
comparison to those of ‘physical illness’.121 
It is evident that in view of the points examined, differences between the evaluative 
properties of mental illness constituents and those of physical illness influence the conceptual 
differences between psychological and physical kinds of medicine and are prima facie 
‘directly relevant’ to the problematic nature of ‘mental illness’ in clinical settings. The 
                                                          
120 K.W.M. (Bill) Fulford, Moral Theory and Medical Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
83. 
121 Ibid., 84. 
34 
 
aforementioned properties also affect the variability factor of ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ 
illnesses. The two types of ‘illness’ are variable in respect to their connotations both ‘cross-
culturally and historically’. The greater variability of ‘mental illness’ in such cases 
demonstrates the wider variation in the criteria against which ‘mental illness constituents’ are 
evaluated. 122  Nonetheless, ‘mental illness’, as a more value-laden concept and ‘physical 
illness’, as a less value-laden notion, are both conceptually sound in spite of the fact that 
‘mental illness’ is more difficult to work with clinically.123 
Fulford further argues that the greater value-ladenness of the concept of ‘mental 
illness’ can be tracked down to the existing diversity in ‘human values’ in regards to 
‘experience and behavior’. Given that he deems values an integral component to 
understanding the definition of ‘disorders’, his proposed model (which promotes the idea that 
‘values’ be considered alongside the ‘facts’) is called the ‘fact-plus-value’ model. To put this 
model into practice, he introduces values-based practice (now on referred to as VBP) as a 
complement to the routinely utilized scientific-driven notion of evidence-based practice (now 
on, EBP).124 
While EBP is based upon the evidence-based medicine (now on EBM), VBP is 
founded upon values-based medicine (or VBM). According to Fulford, when correctly 
implemented, the two, EBM and VBM, will complement one another in that the former deals 
with complexity of facts in healthcare decision-making processes and the latter concerns 
complexity of values in such processes. Fulford clarifies the distinction between the 
evidence- and values-based forms of practice (EBP and VBP respectively) and the evidence- 
and values-based forms of medicine (EBM and VBM respectively) by explaining that while 
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the former refer to practical considerations in healthcare settings, the latter are more 
comprehensive and entail both the theoretical and practical considerations in clinical 
decision-making.125 
Subsequently, Fulford cites ten principles of VBM which emphasize the significance 
of values to the theory and practice. The first five are indicative of the theoretical principles 
of VBM and state that: 
1. All decisions (including clinical ones) are based upon facts and values [the ‘two-
feet principle’]. 
2. Only conflicting values tend to get noticed [the ‘squeaky-wheel principle’]. 
3. Advances in science support inclusion of human values in medicine [the ‘science-
driven principle’]. 
4. VBM first considers the values of patients or patient groups affected by the 
decisions made [the ‘patient-perspective principle’]. 
5. VBM supports resolution of conflicts in values through balancing legitimately 
diverse views [the ‘multi-perspective principle’].126 
Of the above, the first three principles demonstrate similarities between VBM and 
EBM whereas the latter two, reflect the differences between VBM and EBM. Fulford argues 
that the two kinds of medicines (i.e. VBM and EBM) are nonetheless complementary. The 
reason is that while the fourth principle states that at the top of the “values hierarchy”127 are 
the individual values of patients, at the top of the “evidence hierarchy” 128 , there are 
independent and non-relative facts. The fifth principle states that although conflicts in values 
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can be resolved by balancing out relevant views, conflicts in evidence are primarily settled by 
research methods designed to produce value-free facts.129 Furthermore, Fulford clarifies that 
contrary to EBM, there is no right outcome when conflicts in values are under consideration 
and as such, the goal must be set to identifying processes that generate effective action. It 
might be asked how the values of parties involved can be balanced out when the conflicts are 
over fundamental values. He thinks that although the values of service providers might differ 
from individual to individual and from caregivers to patients, it is through the process of 
evaluating these values and looking for the best outcome for the patients (which is made 
possible by engaging the patients and their families in the decision-making processes as much 
as possible and incorporating the ‘quasi-legal model of bioethics’ which offers a resolution 
by making reference to a preapproved and shared rule) that we can arrive at a resolution. It is 
worth mentioning that ‘quasi-legal model of bioethics’ closely resembles EBM in the sense 
that both are outcome-oriented.130 
Returning to the second set of principles or ‘key pointers’, they state the following: 
6. Values are evident in language pending our awareness of their usage in particular 
contexts [the ‘values-blindness principle’]. 
7. Empirical and philosophical methods can help ameliorate understanding of others’ 
values [the ‘values-myopia principle’]. 
8. Ethical reasoning in VBM merely looks at differences of values and is not the 
determinant of the ‘right’ [the ‘space of values principle’]. 
9. Communication skills play a substantive (and not executive) role in VBM [the 
‘how it’s done principle’]. 
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10. Decision-making in VBM is placed with users and service providers in clinical 
settings [the ‘who decides principle’].131 
The first principle makes note of a feature of VBM which deems values in healthcare 
as those that evaluate good and bad judgments. In Hare’s words, values are “prescriptive or 
action-guiding” 132 . 133  Fulford, in accordance with the second principle, states that the 
tendency of values to vary on a spectrum, from the visible and explicit to the invisible and 
implicit, has made the parties involved seek a double standard in their considerations of 
values. That is, as Hare puts it, it is the degree to which values are shared that determines 
their visibility. Stated differently, where the values in question are commonly shared, they 
tend to be implicit and only where the opinions diverge, they tend to get noticed and become 
explicit. For instance, while decisions made in an emergency are thought of as being 
essentially scientific (given the implicit essence of the values involved), they are deemed to 
be of an ethical nature once the question is one of the soundness of providing developing 
countries with cheap anti-AIDS drugs (due to the explicitness of values).134 
The third principle points to the shift in values from being widely-shared to being 
overtly diverse in medicine. Such diversity could be traced back to five sources and factors. 
First, their inherent diversity; second, their diverse origins (including individual, cultural, and 
professional); and third, their diversity given the fact of individualism; that is, there is a 
variety of values for each person within different contexts or at different times and within 
different cultures and at different historical intervals. The final two factors can be grouped 
into external and internal elements. Of the former, Fulford cites ‘increasing individualism’, 
‘rejection of authority’, ‘global travel and communication’, and ‘an increasingly 
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cosmopolitan society’. The internal factor involves scientific progress. That is, advancements 
in science continuously ‘opens up choices’ and the availability of choices inevitably brings 
about ‘values’.135  
The fourth principle reinforces the idea that the diversity in views is ‘legitimate’. The 
legitimacy, in turn entails that within clinical settings, knowledge of key operative values 
(despite being necessary as the seventh principle states) is inadequate due to absence of the 
‘actual values of the particular’ parties affected.136 While this principle’s patient-centred 
nature allows us to assign priority to individual values, the fifth principle cites the inevitable 
disagreements that arise as a result of such assignment. These could be resolved not by a 
consensus of facts (as in the EBM), but by a ‘dissensus’ or the “processes that support action 
through a balance of legitimately different value perspectives”.137 It is crucial to note that 
‘dissensus’ has a particular meaning for Fulford. He states: 
“Despite its name, “dissensus” ... is not about disagreement in the sense of dissent 
(falling out). Dissensus can be thought of rather as a particular values-based take on 
“agreeing to disagree.” In the more familiar consensus, those concerned come to an 
agreement on whose values are right. In dissensus, differences of values, instead of 
being resolved, remain in play to be balanced according to the circumstances 
presented by particular decisions”.138 
 
Fulford next focuses on four key areas of clinical skills which help VBM in providing 
what he refers to as ‘good process’ (in contrast to ‘good outcome’) and on ‘how it is done’ 
(versus on ‘what is done’). To this end, he proceeds by examining the sixth principle which 
specifies the first skills area or ‘awareness of values’. It points to the value-related problems 
in clinical settings that can be traced back to ‘values blindness’ or the failure to recognize 
values in practice. Of its many sources, Fulford mentions three: 1) invisibility of shared 
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values; 2) ascription to a system of shared values by endorsing a ‘professional identity’; and 
3) shifting the attention away from values by new scientific discoveries.139 However, Fulford 
thinks that an awareness of values could be gained once knowledge of their existence is 
complemented by an understanding of their usage in language. To support this idea, he refers 
to J. L. Austin’s assertion that a proper understanding of the connotation of values in 
particular contexts can be gained by examining the laypeople’s language. This approach is 
particularly important in VBP as there can be a wide range of differences in the values of 
individual service providers involved in care of a given patient and also in the values of 
providers and users of services.140 
The seventh principle is concerned with the second skills area or knowledge of values. 
Values-myopia is the idea that other people’s values resemble one’s very own. Therefore, the 
second crucial skill to VBM specifies the significance of having knowledge of the values 
involved or at play in particular decision-making contexts. To gain this knowledge, one could 
make use of the empirical and philosophical resources of other people’s values. Of the first, 
he notes: 1) ‘firsthand narratives; 2) use of literary sources like poetry; 3) anthropological 
methods; 4) psychological techniques; and 5) surveys’. The philosophical method he has in 
mind is continental with its phenomenology and hermeneutics.141  
While he assumes that the previous principle could reconcile many conflicting and 
divergent views of values, he explains that for the difficult-to-resolve cases, one must resort 
to the eighth principle of VBM which specifies the third skills area, or that of reasoning about 
values.142 In healthcare, two methods of reasoning are routinely applied – consequentialism 
and deontology. In clinical settings, on the other hand, the two dominant methods are: 1) 
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“principles: [or the] “top-down” reasoning from general principles”143, and 2) “casuistry: [or 
the] “bottom-up” reasoning, direct from cases” 144 . Fulford contends that although the 
differences in values may at times require resolution in VBM, such differences often provide 
a rich resource for clinical decision making. He likens these divergent values perspectives to 
‘lenses or filters’ which often accord to and bring to light values of individual patients. In this 
sense, not only are the conflicting values conducive to effective clinical decision making but 
they are also a rich resource for making decisions that closely conform to the values of 
individuals concerned.145 
Where the three mentioned skills fail to resolve conflicts, the ninth principle (which 
expresses the fourth skills area – the communication skills) comes into play.146 He clarifies 
that there are two essential communication skills in VBM, namely: 1) ‘patient-perspective 
skills’ or the skills that are incremental to understanding patient values. These form the basis 
of the fourth, sixth, seventh, and eighth principles despite the fact that values of individual 
patients are ‘irreducible’;147 and 2) ‘multi-perspective skills’ which assist us in arriving at a 
balance of values. These form the basis of the fifth principle which aims at replacing 
consensus with dissensus. Overall, communication skills play a crucial role in 1) 
identification and recognition of the different values involved in a particular case (which is 
complementary to principles 6-8), and 2) resolving conflicts in values where the views are in 
serious conflict. The second role clarifies the reason for the argument (in principle 5) to the 
effect that VBM not only involves the ‘what’ is done, but also the ‘how’ it is done.148 Finally, 
the tenth principle of VBM removes the authority to decide from the hands of doctors and 
                                                          
143 K.W.M. (Bill) Fulford, Facts/Values: Ten Principles of Values-Based Medicine,” in The Philosophy of 
Psychiatry, ed. Jennifer Radden (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 222. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid., 223. 
147 Ibid., 223-224. 
148 Ibid., 224. 
41 
 
ethicists and places it back ‘where it belongs’ – that is, at the discretion of those involved in 
the process or the users and providers of services.149 
Subsequently, Fulford considers the problems in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders or the DSM and explains that the issues in the various versions 
of these manuals originate from inconsistencies in their treatment of values. According to 
him, the upward inconsistencies become evident in the shift from the definition of disorder to 
its scientific description. The downward inconsistencies, on the other hand, reflect the 
divergence when we move from the definition of disorder to the specific diagnostic 
categories. 150  The upward inconsistencies become apparent on the first reading of the 
definition of ‘disorder’ in the DSMs and once particular attention is paid to sections which 
emphasize that mental disorder must not be diagnosed “... on the basis of social values alone, 
[and as such] it ‘must not be merely an expectable and culturally sanctioned response’”151. 
The implication of this caveat is that social values play a dominant role in defining both the 
concept of ‘mental disorder’ and the particular mental disorders.152 
The downward inconsistencies are recognized once the second and third readings are 
considered. On the second reading, it clarifies that the “...impairment in social, occupational 
or other important area of functioning ... may not be considered problematic by the individual 
...”153. The third reading lays out the fact that “these individuals are rarely self-referred and 
usually come to the attention of mental health professionals only when their behaviour has 
brought them into conflict with sexual partners or society”154. Therefore, notwithstanding the 
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caveat, the DSMs allow for diagnosis of mental disorders on the basis of social values alone. 
Fulford argues that the implication of such diversity in value considerations in the DSMs is 
that clinical judgments are at minimum, partly value-laden. As this example demonstrates, by 
these inconsistencies, the DSMs fail to acknowledge the dominance of values in psychiatric 
diagnosis.155 
I will now shift the attention to the argument posited by John Z. Sadler. Sadler 
endorses the ‘fact-plus-value’ model by Fulford and argues against the possibility of defining 
‘disorders’ in value-free terms. He initiates his discussion by defining values as “... concepts 
we use to guide our actions, lead us to be deserving of praise or blame, and are assumed, to 
greater or lesser degree, in just about any everyday activity” 156. As such, values play a 
descriptive role in that they can thoroughly evaluate the quality of things (e.g. they can 
determine whether a particular entity or quality has intrinsic value) and can affect 
individuals’ choices and actions by providing a benchmark against which value judgments 
could be made. Consequently, values form an integral part of a ‘(sub)culture’, vary on a 
‘continuum’, entail the ‘inherent (intrinsic) property’ of entities, and demonstrate the many 
particular ways in which they could be diverse.157 
He explains that in philosophy, qualities used to describe entities are called 
‘predicates’. To make a distinction between the two types of predicates, he asserts that in the 
statement ‘the apple is red and good’, ‘red’ and ‘good’ are distinct in that the former refers to 
an objective, factual, and empirically-verifiable quality of the apple and the latter merely 
represents a subjective, non-factual, and variable value judgment about it. He contends that 
subjective value judgments can be easily identified by an awareness of the significant amount 
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of disagreements that they result in.158 He argues that in the statement ‘James Carter is the 
greatest living jazz saxophonist’, while his being the best is open to debate and a matter of 
opinion, his being a saxophonist is a universally-endorsed fact.159 
Subsequently, Sadler refers to the role of values in the DSM. Classification of 
disorders inevitably requires the ability to distinguish one form of disease from another and 
consequently, it is largely dependent on proper diagnosis. He points to a standard dictionary 
definition of ‘diagnosis’ as 1) “the art of distinguishing one disease from another”160 and 2) 
“the determination of the nature of a case of disease”161. The use of ‘determination’ implies 
that something beyond making a distinction is involved in diagnosis which can be summed 
up as a holistic understanding of the clinical situation.162 He concludes that diagnosis must be 
evaluated in light of its two components; that is, in terms of ‘diagnosis-as-denotation’ and 
‘diagnosis-as-process’. While the former represents classification and naming disorders, the 
latter entails the ‘approach’ (or the procedure) to diagnosis. Diagnosis-as-process implies a 
more general understanding of clinical contexts and it is only through its incorporation 
alongside diagnosis-as-denotation that can result in a proper diagnosis.163 
Having provided the standard definition of diagnosis, he proceeds to evaluate the 
DSM’s current status. He contends that despite its prominent position in categorization of 
mental disorders, the DSM is quite incomplete as a handbook of proper diagnostic and 
clinical practice. 164  The DSM also fails at another level; although there is value in its 
employment of ordinary language and its being a user-friendly piece, it gives the reader the 
wrong impression that it is usable by anyone. In other words, it does not have the appearance 
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of a technical document.165 Furthermore, he argues that to be engaged in proper diagnostic 
practice, diagnosticians must have knowledge of the system of classification and categories 
and additionally, be aware of ‘how’ to utilize the tools at their disposal (or ‘how’ to be 
clinicians). He believes that this awareness can only be attained once the common features of 
what he broadly calls ‘healing practices’, are identified. Stated rather briefly, the seven 
features are: ‘characterization, disclosure, embedded observation, relevance, privilege, 
rationality, and ritual’.166 
1. Diagnosis-as-characterization: the diagnostician views the malady as an exemplar 
of a condition that is shared with or was experienced by some other individuals 
and results in similar symptoms.167 
2. Diagnosis-as-disclosure: the diagnostician’s role is to recognize and reveal that 
which is unavailable to the patient and is crucial to effective clinical 
intervention.168 
3. Diagnosis-as-embedded observation: moving between patient complaint and the 
related context, the diagnostician must search for clues irrespective of where and 
in which domain it might be embedded in.169 
4. Diagnosis-as-relevance: the diagnostician is guided by the practical value of the 
information obtained in helping or treating a patient. Therefore, diagnosis is 
shaped by its degree of relevance to therapeutic intervention.170 
5. Diagnosis-as-privilege: the diagnostician, by virtue of having access to private 
information of a patient and employing their knowledge and expertise in the field, 
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is given considerable power. The clinician also has a moral duty to serve, care, 
and cure. Fusing these factors together, diagnosis can be seen as a privilege.171 
6. Diagnosis-as-rationality: in addition to observation, the diagnostician must 
interpret findings. Therefore, diagnosis is, in Sadler’s words, a ‘deliberative and 
rational’ act. In view of the dual definition of the term, diagnosis-as-denotation 
pinpoints the presence of theoretical reason, whereas diagnosis-as-process entails 
the necessity of practical reason. This duality of reason leads to problems 
particularly in use of diagnostic classifications in clinical practice.172 
7. Diagnosis-as-ritual: this refers to the standards that are followed in making a 
diagnosis. In the West, these include: “diagnostic descriptions, diagnostic criteria, 
structured interviews, mental status examination, and DSM diagnostic decision 
trees”173.174 
Sadler argues that the aforementioned features do not explicitly describe the 
characteristics of proper clinical practice. However, the values that are implied by these 
features can mark out proper from improper practices. The following five conditions – which 
Sadler calls diagnostic aesthetics – define the limits of good clinical practice.175 
1. ‘Diagnosis should provide a simple characterization’; that is, it should simplify a 
complex phenomenon into a manageable and comprehensible entity. The way a 
good diagnosis fulfills this goal is via naming the condition itself or naming a 
collection of particular phenomena. The latter reflects characterization of 
conditions by defining them in terms of ‘syndrome’, ‘ideal type’, ‘dimension’, and 
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‘diagnostic category’. 176  He clearly warns against oversimplification of 
characterization which in his opinion can be prevented by pairing and balancing 
out the inherent reductionism with other considerations.177 
2. ‘Diagnosis should involve ongoing reinterpretation’. This clause could be traced 
back to the second common feature of diagnosis namely, ‘disclosure’. 
Reinterpretation occurs when clinicians employ their expert knowledge to 
reinterpret the phenomena in consideration of patients’ information and reach an 
understanding that was previously absent and then disclosure is made. He 
emphasizes that reinterpretation is an ongoing task for the whole duration of the 
clinical relationship. As an example, it contributes to assessments of the patient’s 
response to treatment, modification of the treatment focus, and determination of 
the end to treatment, among others. It is also beneficial in that it prevents 
‘premature diagnostic closure’ and restricts the tendency to oversimplify the 
diagnosis.178 
Given the possibility of having conflicting interpretations, Sadler recommends 
adding ‘embedded observation’ to the bundle since it can guide and direct 
reinterpretation. 179  For instance, consideration of the context of diagnosis can 
eliminate pragmatically false interpretations.180 He notes that placing too much 
value into diagnostic reinterpretation could result in what he labels ‘diagnostic 
indecisiveness’. Furthermore, he acknowledges that requiring diagnostic 
simplicity and reinterpretation is difficult to meet.181 
                                                          
176 John Z. Sadler, Values and Psychiatric Diagnosis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 423. 
177 Ibid., 423-424. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid., 424. 
180 Ibid., 424-425. 
181 Ibid., 425. 
47 
 
3. ‘Diagnosis should forge clinical understanding and moral purpose into therapeutic 
action’. This condition provides for the feasibility of balancing diagnostic 
simplicity with diagnostic reinterpretation. It does so by pointing to the diagnostic 
characteristic of ‘relevance’ which itself is founded upon the moral-pragmatic 
features of clinical contexts. It is the action-forging of clinical understanding and 
moral purpose that directs us in resolving the tension between simplicity and 
reinterpretation. Taking the effective course of action in clinical intervention is the 
key to arriving at a resolution.182  
Sadler is clear that even if a given case does not fit the specifications of the 
classification categories, the more the clinician can forge effective action, the 
greater the diagnosis finesse.183 This entails that clinicians must not get entangled 
in particular DSM or ICD categories for making a proper diagnosis and that 
pragmatism requires incorporation of all the different factors in making a 
psychiatric diagnosis. These involve understanding and explanation of the 
disorder which are restricted by the therapeutic tools available to the clinician. 
Therefore, the clinicians’ accuracy in making a diagnosis inevitably depends on 
the degree that they can “forge effective action from characterization and 
reinterpretation”184.185 There are dangers associated with an unbalanced forging 
action. Firstly, it may result in ‘premature closure’ or imposition of a false 
understanding upon a patient and secondly, it may result in unnecessary 
therapeutic interventions lacking any discretion. The remedy can be found in the 
incorporation of diagnostic characterization and reinterpretation.186 
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4. ‘Diagnosis should respect the patient’. Diagnostic respect has four characteristics. 
First, it is both a moral action and a means to advancing therapeutic goals. 
Second, it allows clinicians to enter patients’ phenomenal world and characterize 
and reinterpret anew. 187  Third, a clinician’s diagnostic understanding is 
incomplete without an appraisal of what the patient is willing and able to do in 
treatment.188 Finally, it entails finesse in dealing with ‘practical limitations’ in 
addition to ‘moral dignity’. Unbalanced diagnostic respect may result in overtly 
slow assessment and intervention which may lead to a worsening of the patient’s 
condition, for example. Therefore, diagnostic respect when left unchecked could 
cause a reductio ad absurdum or in Sadler’s own words, “an unjustified deferment 
of action-taking”189.190 
5. ‘Diagnosis should be faithful’. This requirement has a regulatory role as it is 
applicable to the previous four conditions. Furthermore, it engages several 
diagnostic values which demand diagnosis to be “rigorous, accountable, thorough, 
and consistent”191. These values entail faithfulness to “data, patient, context, and 
procedure” 192  respectively. Therefore, faithfulness by mediating interactions 
between diagnostic values, balances them out. For instance, when applied to 
diagnostic simplification, faithfulness ensures that the values at play restrict and 
prevent over- and under-simplification by attending to the complex phenomenon 
under consideration and simplifying it. The multitude of values involved in this 
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case includes “diagnostic accuracy, precision, coherence, [and] 
correspondence”193, among others.194 
Once applied to reinterpretation, faithfulness involves assessments of actions 
based on ‘closeness of fit’. Fitness is to be evaluated not only in regards to ‘the 
phenomenon and diagnosis’, but also in respect to ‘the phenomenon and 
therapeutic potential’ and ‘the diagnosis and patient respect’, for instance. The 
aim would be to unify the patient’s views with the diagnostician’s reinterpretation, 
to conform diagnostic characterization with the availability of therapeutic means, 
to make changes in treatment methods based upon the patient’s response to 
treatment, and the like.195 In other words, in reinterpretation, faithfulness implies 
awareness of the many ways that phenomenon, diagnosis, and intervention affect 
one another. In its application to diagnostic respect, faithfulness pushes for 
following professional ethics in providing services to the diagnosed, particularly 
since accuracy of diagnosis is not the only consideration in ensuring faithfulness 
to diagnostic respect as the patient may be offended by the label and cease 
treatment.196 
Sadler states that the diagnostic features and requirements that were thoroughly 
discussed up to this point bring to light considerations that are beyond those addressed by the 
DSMs (or the ICDs in Europe) as these manuals focus on raising an awareness of the 
distinction between diagnostic concepts and diagnostic practice. 197 Having noted the two 
definitions of ‘diagnosis’ (as a noun and a verb – where the former reflects the classification 
or categorization of disorders and the latter refers to the process or procedure of making a 
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diagnosis), Sadler argues that many of the issues often cited with psychiatric diagnosis and 
the DSMs are due to our ignorance of this duality in definition of the term.  
For example, the two senses of ‘diagnosis’ are often unwittingly used interchangeably 
resulting in a confusion of the flaws in diagnostic taxonomy with those in diagnostic practice. 
Furthermore, given the associated difficulty with specification of features of proper clinical 
practice, this crucial task is often neglected. Moreover, he contends that values play a 
substantial role in psychiatric diagnosis especially since diagnostic procedure (and the values 
involved in the process) triumphs over diagnostic classification. He also thinks that an under-
appreciation of psychiatric values has contributed to the development of many of the existing 
problems in psychiatry.198 
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§ Fulford’s Critique of Boorse’s Medical Model 
I will now shift the attention to Fulford’s critique of the Boorsian model. Fulford 
agrees with Boorse on the value-ladenness of the concept of ‘illness’ and on the fact that this 
concept (contrary to ‘disease’) is more often used in non-technical contexts.199 While ‘illness’ 
is used to convey that “something is wrong” 200 , ‘disease’ is used to express “what is 
wrong” 201 . He states that most causes of illness are ‘protean’ and have ‘disturbance of 
functioning’ as a shared common element. From this Boorse concludes that ‘diseases’ must 
be defined in terms of ‘disturbances of bodily functions’. 202 Fulford, however, finds the 
Boorsian view inconsistent given that despite being capable of explaining cases where one is 
diseased without being ill, it cannot provide a meaningful explanation of the opposite cases 
(that is, it fails to explain instances when one is ill without being diseased such as the case of 
someone experiencing a hangover).203  
It is important to note that Boorse aims at defining ‘function’ in value-free terms. 
Fulford rejects the credibility of this stance since the teleological (i.e. goal-oriented) nature of 
‘function’ links it with ‘purposes and values’. 204  Therefore, while it is reasonable for 
naturalists (such as Boorse) to take ‘value-free’ as ‘teleology-free’, they generally tend to aim 
at reducing the ‘teleological’ explanation to a ‘causal’ one. 205  Boorse maintains the 
‘teleological’ aspect of ‘goal’ and offers a value and ‘teleology-free’ definition for ‘function’ 
as the “standard causal contribution to a goal actually pursued by the organism”206.207 Fulford 
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identifies two problems with this definition: the general difficulty is concerning the concept 
of goal being inherently evaluative in meaning given that a goal is “good to hit and bad to 
miss” 208 and the specific difficulty is regarding the inapplicability of ‘function’ (as part-
function) to ‘mental disorders’ since these involve the person as a whole and not individual 
organs and systems.209  
The second difficulty becomes evident when the case of individuals feeling ill (whose 
conditions have not been either identified or diagnosed, yet) is considered. These patients 
cannot be said to suffer from diseases of the Boorsian kind which require knowledge of the 
occurrence of a ‘particular disturbance of function’. The third problem with Boorse’s model 
is related to our ordinary use of ‘disease’ (and not ‘illness’) of plants and animals as we 
employ the term about people. Boorse thinks that the difference reflects a variety in forms of 
value judgments that we commonly make of people and other living beings.210 In spite of this 
difference, it would be a mistake to think of illnesses as serious diseases which incapacitate 
the afflicted party because if this were true, we would have to label a disease-incapacitated 
plant or animal ‘ill’ and this, we clearly do not do.211 
The fourth issue is in respect to the ‘logical relationship’ between ‘disease’ and 
‘illness’. The Boorsian model demands that all diseases be disturbances of function. 
However, neither are all diseases disturbances of function nor are such disturbances always 
diseases. For instance, one may be wounded but cannot be called ‘diseased’. Therefore, the 
above distinction is ‘too broad’. The fifth objection to Boorse concerns treating ‘illness’ as a 
subcategory of ‘disease’ which is equivalent to a ‘disturbance in functioning’; this implies 
that when someone is said to be ill, it is meant that they are not functioning properly. Fulford 
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explains that when ‘ill’ is substituted with ‘not functioning properly’ in a statement like ‘he is 
ill’, the meaning thus arrived at is distinct from the original connotation of the sentence since 
it could be understood as stating that the person is not functioning properly in ‘some social 
role’.212 
Fulford contends that Boorse’s account can survive if his model is deemed as offering 
the crucial definitions for the purposes of ‘medical theory’. In fact, his assumption of the 
possibility of defining ‘disease’ in value-free terms is prominent in the technical contexts of 
medicine. However, his theory is subject to shortcomings when the objective is to explain 
ordinary usage. Despite these, it can still be a helpful model once it is assessed from the 
perspective of its practical utility. 213 Given that the medical model is only successful in 
respect to ‘empirical clinical problems’, it fails to successfully address the ‘non-empirical’ 
problems arising in analytical research. Therefore, adoption of the medical model for 
analytical research purposes merely complicates the problems that research must address.214A 
clear example of this problem is Boorse’s example of ‘homosexuality’. In order to resolve the 
dispute about its disease-status, he redefines the ‘scope of medical theory’ to exclude the 
debate altogether.215 The failure of Boorse’s model to account for the logical characteristics 
of the medical concepts is, in Fulford’s opinion, related to the fact that the three terms 
(namely, ‘illness’, ‘disease’, and ‘dysfunction’) are inherently value-laden.216 
Furthermore, upon defining ‘dysfunction’ and ‘disease’ in factual, descriptive terms, 
Boorse slips into evaluative definitions. For instance, despite initially defining ‘disease’ in 
descriptive terms and as “...a deviation from the natural (= statistically typical) functional 
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organisation of the species ...”217, he offers another definition two lines later in evaluative 
terms and this time ‘disease’ is viewed as “a deficiency in the functional efficiency of the 
body”218. While ‘deviation’ of the functional organization of a member of a given species 
might be better, worse, or of equal worth in comparison to that typical of a species, the claim 
to its functional inefficiency clearly involves value-judgments since it could be assessed as 
not functioning well, or properly or successfully or as it ought to do.219 
Boorse attempts to broaden his definition of ‘deviation from the natural’ to include 
both ‘statistically atypical conditions and those brought about by ‘environmental causes’. 
Shortly after, he uses the evaluative “hostile environment” 220 in place of ‘environmental 
causes’. Another slippage occurs when he defines ‘mental illness’ as an ‘interference with a 
mental function’. Given that distinguishing interference requires a value-judgment and since 
he could have used a neutral term (for instance, ‘effect’) such slippage significantly 
undermines his theory.221 Boorse allows value-judgments by ‘ordinary implication’ – that is, 
he allows for consideration of disease as a condition that is generally evaluated negatively but 
argues against the idea of a negative value-judgment being a part of the ‘meaning’ of 
‘disease’.222 Nonetheless, he allows evaluations to take part in the meaning of the terms as his 
example of ‘intelligent’ demonstrates. In non-technical contexts, the term ‘intelligent’ has a 
positive value-judgment built into its meaning and is clearly evaluative; despite this, Boorse 
deems it purely descriptive in technical contexts.223 
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‘Disease’ and ‘dysfunction’ are similar to the term ‘intelligent’ in that they are 
evaluated (albeit negatively); in addition, the terms contain ‘descriptive information’ as a part 
of their meaning similar to that of ‘intelligent’.224 The difference between the two sets of 
terms is that while ‘intelligent’ can be used with a descriptive connotation, the other two 
terms cannot be defined in purely descriptive terms (as Boorse’s slippage made it clear).225 
Indeed it is ‘strictly impossible’ to use ‘disease’ and ‘dysfunction’ in purely descriptive 
terms. Descriptivists might suggest reinterpreting Boorsian theory as one holding that value-
judgments expressed by value-terms ‘disease’ and ‘dysfunction’ are entailed by certain 
descriptions. Therefore, to have a ‘disease’ or ‘dysfunction’ is equivalent to being in a 
functional state which results in a reduction in life expectancy and reproductive capacity. 
Hence, the value-judgments entailed by the two terms are offered by the same description.226 
In the subsequent chapter, I will thoroughly discuss my views on the ‘fact-plus-value’ 
model and by pointing to the inconsistencies and deficiencies of the views of Fulford and 
Sadler, I will raise my concerns. The forthcoming chapter will end with an overview of a 
possible solution to reducing or possibly eliminating the problems by recommending that 
certain changes be made to ensure coherence of the accounts under consideration. 
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Chapter 4: Critique of The Fact Plus Value Model, 
Possible Solutions & Concluding Remarks  
 
 A clear indication of the fact-plus-value model is that despite medicine’s historical 
inclination towards incorporation of a fact-only approach, psychiatry is, at its core, value-
laden. Whether this drives psychiatry away from the medical orientation that its practitioners 
wish to have is a question that Fulford rejects. For him, values play an integral role alongside 
facts in developing a proper understanding of the concept of ‘disorder’ and particularly of 
‘mental disorder’. He seeks the assistance of philosophy by employing linguistic analysis in 
distinguishing between factual and value-laden statements and arguing for R. M. Hare’s view 
that “all value terms may under certain circumstances, be used with clear factual 
meaning” 227 . However, this position is, in my opinion, problematic with respect to 
psychiatry. 
 For instance, Fulford’s failure to provide a methodical guideline for identifying 
factual concepts in their own terms results in an ambiguity that cannot be resolved easily. Put 
differently, it is relatively simple for one to slide from the assertion that ‘all value terms can 
sometimes have factual connotations’ to the argument that no factual term can essentially 
exist since what appears to be factual may turn out to be a value term concealed under a 
factual cover. This is worrisome in that Fulford does not proceed to define the particular 
circumstances or instances where values can have factual meanings, resulting in an increased 
complexity in application. Subsequently, it would be very convenient for the reader to 
assume that no boundaries need to be set and this, lands us in a slippery slope in that the 
absence of pre-defined boundaries would make one assume that it is safe to apply the notion 
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of terms being value-terms with merely factual appearances in all circumstances or 
conditions.  
 Furthermore, I am concerned that rejection of the existence of factual terms can only 
make them second-class, arbitrary terms that are unverifiable, unless values are blended into 
their consideration. That is, factual terms can only be deemed essentially factual by virtue of 
their lack of evaluative qualities. This means that it is only through making a direct 
comparison with values that factual terms can represent distinct entities. In other words, 
unless values are present as the benchmark for identification of factual terms, they could not 
be recognized as distinct entities. This renders their existence largely dependent on values 
which would subsequently make them a sub-category of values. As a result, facts lose the 
very solid essence that they have been long assumed to have and by questioning their 
inherent quality, we are merely placing the solidity of our knowledge foundation under fire. 
Moreover, it is clearly against the spirit of the Fulfordian argument to award such precedence 
to values by implicitly reducing facts to sub-entities within the evaluative sphere and under 
the influence of values. 
 A possible consequence of this position is that all terms in general would have to be 
deemed as value terms and the possibility of having independently identifiable facts becomes 
suspect. The question is, if all terms are indeed value terms and no external factual term 
exists, why are we to even bother trying to make a distinction? Clearly, facts play an 
undeniable and crucial role in our understanding of psychopathology, which is evidently 
demonstrated in the case of neurocognitive disorders (such as dementia or in terminology of 
DSM 5 – major or mild neurocognitive disorders). As mentioned in Chapter One, this 
Fulfordian conjecture seems to equate factual terms with ‘terms with less evaluative content 
and force and with merely an overt factual connotation’. Consequently, I fail to see how this 
position could successfully explain the factual content or causes of such disorders. I do not 
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believe that he intends to define major neurocognitive disorders merely in terms of the 
afflicted person’s failure at fulfilling a certain function (irrespective of whether it is in the 
form of a reduction of function or absence of it) and by doing so, deny the role of factual data 
underlying the disorder in the whole diagnostic enterprise.  
 In fact, radical social constructivists may argue that the distinction he makes (between 
‘use’ and ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ of factual and value terms) is capable of resolving the issue; 
that is, it should be sufficient that terms be factual only in ‘use’ and not in ‘nature’. They 
might reason that as long as values precede facts, in connotation and applicability, having the 
purely factual terms is not necessary. In other words, they tend to think that since values have 
a broader range of applicability in psychiatry, the few facts that we know about this field of 
medicine can be blended into value terms, making the factual terms’ distinct existence 
unnecessary. This implies that they are predominantly placing an overt authority in the hands 
of values while facts are almost entirely absent. 
 I do not share this view. No matter how clear a distinction we could make, factual 
terms need to be factual in both their ‘use’ and ‘nature’. A term that is factual in use alone 
cannot be deemed inherently factual. Imagine being on the road where you encounter a 
yellow traffic light. Yellow is a factual predicate of the traffic light. Since it is a concept that 
is verifiable and shared with others, the proposition that ‘the traffic light is yellow’ states a 
fact. Nowhere within the sphere of our thoughts may we allow someone to say otherwise. 
The discrepancy in Fulford’s account becomes obvious when his former and latter views are 
compared. On the one hand, he supports the factual nature of the above statement. He agrees 
that facts do exist independently of values and this is clear where he implicitly acknowledges 
that empirically-verifiable, objectively-true, and commonly-endorsed scientific ideas describe 
facts that are in essence factual. On the other hand, based on R.M. Hare’s assertion (about the 
possibility of having value terms that are factual in appearance) he argues for the evaluative 
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essence of ‘physical disorders’. If facts can indeed be independently identified in view of 
their commonly-shared qualities (which I deem both possible and desirable), then Fulford 
should not need to argue for the evaluative nature of a historically-known factual term. Doing 
so would only make values very influential in his account and given the lack of a proper 
description of boundaries, his account turns out to be too evaluative.  
 Furthermore, Fulford claims that VBM complements EBM and that the two are to be 
used as parallels. This view, as he notes, takes away the possibility of VBM replacing EBM. 
The conflict arising in this case is related to the priority and dominance he implicitly assigns 
to values. It is not clear to me why we are to accept the argument he posits in defence of the 
role that values play (by allowing them to take part in every concept, diagnosis, and decision-
making processes) and not be convinced that in light of their comprehensiveness and broad 
spectrum of applicability (that is, in both theory and practice), values can eliminate the need 
for facts. It is worthwhile to note that he does not argue for the elimination of facts; however, 
in my opinion, this is a possible consequence of the arguments he makes. Furthermore, this 
would entail that his argument in regards to the place of factual inputs on the continuum of 
definition is, contrary to his view, a matter of the degree of value-ladenness. Therefore, while 
Fulford aims at clarifying the distinction between facts and values, I think that he is only 
adding to the difficulty.  
 Moreover, while he proposes a model under which facts and values occupy distinct 
positions within the theory, the model that he ends up developing is one in which the 
boundaries between facts and values are blurred. In addition, within his new continuum, facts 
are not explicitly observable since the spectrum of constituents of ‘disorder’ revolves around 
an evaluation of the degrees of values involved. Indeed, the role of facts is so minimal that 
they cannot possibly provide a benchmark for the assessments of terms. Below, I have 
provided a graph of the two positions Fulford takes on. 
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      Fulford’s Claimed Position    Fulford’s Actual Position 
      VBM and EBM as Parallels           EBM as a subcategory of VBM  
 
  As the diagrams demonstrate, Fulford has assumed that VBM plus EBM would result 
in what can be optimistically called proper medicine. However, he fails to maintain this 
position by granting values more room to influence our knowledge of psychopathology. 
Therefore, arguing for the equality and parallelism of VBM and EBM underestimates his 
main objective (that is, increasing the awareness of values). In order to ensure consistency in 
his arguments, Fulford must either try to resolve the matter by specifying the boundaries of 
values or alternatively, revise his current position in regards to the significance of facts and 
the crucial role that EBM plays. However, in order to make the most minimal effort in 
revising his argument, I suggest that he should re-position the facts and place them within the 
boundaries of values. The diagram below clarifies my point. 
 
 
 
 Although this modification can potentially help Fulford’s theory, I do not support its 
validity. I think that once we adopt this new model, we will be locked in a position that 
considers ‘disorder’ in general and ‘mental disorder’ in particular as social constructs. The 
danger of assuming this position becomes evident once we realize that our means of 
identifying psychopathology is limited to values alone particularly since facts are merely a 
subcategory of values and they themselves are recognized in light of existent values. It is 
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clear that once we are left with only values as our guide to identification of ‘disorders’, 
containing or restricting the influence of socially-accepted norms and culturally-specific 
customs becomes impossible. The society in that event would define and determine the 
constituents of maladies and would further describe and develop proper treatment modalities. 
This means that the catalogue of unhealthy conditions would vary widely from one society to 
the next. It also opens the door for the state’s imposition of paternalistic policies and their 
inevitable coercion. However, this cannot truly hold since there are disorders that have 
empirically-verifiable and largely-shared factual causes, such as CAD (or Coronary Artery 
Disease). We know that a diet comprised of fatty foods and lack of physical activity can 
cause CAD. Moreover, we have a solid medical means to treat the condition (whether with 
medications or surgery). While values can help us get acquainted with the lifestyle of people 
around the world, they cannot point to a particular social construct that is responsible for the 
development of CAD or alternatively provide us with a solid means of treating CAD. It is 
important to emphasize that in my opinion, facts are our best means of restricting values. 
Once our scientific understanding of the factual causes of mental disorders advances, we 
would be in a much better position to utilize facts in limiting the role that values play in our 
current nosology simply by incorporating them more in defining psychopathological 
conditions. In that case, facts would provide us with a solid and objective benchmark against 
which particular conditions can be assessed in order to determine whether they can qualify as 
instances of mental disorders. 
 His placement of EBM under the supposedly more general heading of VBM can 
potentially lead to another kind of difficulty as well. One could overextend his argument and 
claim that given the dominance of values in psychiatry and their more comprehensive nature 
in comparison to facts, psychiatry has precedence over all other medical specialties. In that 
case, psychiatry would be an all-encompassing field that acts as the guide and benchmark 
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against which efficiency and appropriateness of treatment modalities and medical practice are 
evaluated. To realize this potential, Fulford must demonstrate that other specialties are in 
effect dependent upon the values that psychiatry addresses. Although he does not explicitly 
provide an argument in support of this view, I believe that he could back up this hypothesis in 
a different way; that is, on the basis of the practical priority of psychiatry since it is capable 
of incorporating or including both VBM and EBM. In view of the fact that even despite the 
superiority of VBM, EBM could still survive (as a sub-category) under psychiatry whereas 
under other specialties values are not considered or incorporated into EBM, psychiatry could 
act as a module under which other medical specialties would be placed in respect to their 
degree of dependence upon values. 
 However, taking this route is not problem-free either. Psychiatry stands at one 
extreme end of the values spectrum while other specialties rest on the other end. The question 
is, ‘why are we to prefer one extreme position to the other?’ While values are under-balanced 
on the EBM side, they are overrated on the VBM side. I am hesitant to accept either view 
since they are both out of balance. I think the solution could be found in a medical orientation 
that is the result of a combination of psychiatry and an EBM-based specialty. In my opinion, 
the issue could be resolved if we merge psychiatry and neurology. The new field that emerges 
(which we may for the ease of reference call neuropsychiatry) is a much better balanced view 
and can address both EBM and VBM sorts of concerns. It could then provide us with a more 
comprehensive and practical approach to define or assess and diagnose ‘disorders’. I think 
that neurology is our best available option particularly since all mental disorders appear to 
originate in the brain. My belief is partially supported by the recent advancements in 
developing the next generation of psychopharmacological agents that tend to be effective in 
reducing or eliminating symptoms of an array of mental disorders (and these have been 
particularly helpful in cases of schizophrenia and psychotic disorders). These agents are 
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known to affect the balance of neurotransmitters in the brain in one way or another. My view 
is further supported by improvements in our understanding of the role that talk-therapies play 
in controlling or reducing symptoms of psychopathology. Talk-therapies have been proven 
effective by virtue of the changes that they make in the brain functions of patients and their 
subsequent modification of behavior. 
  It is important to note that neuropsychiatry does not automatically dismiss psychiatry 
or place the future of the field into jeopardy. It is rather a matter of balancing out conflicting 
views. Granted that psychiatry (as we know it today) will not remain the same, the changes 
made are crucial to the development of an acceptable definition of ‘disorder’. I think that 
neurology could also help psychiatry in regards to the DSMs by balancing out and 
supplementing the values that are embedded within the diagnostic categories with facts. 
Moreover, neuropsychiatry could also shift the attention away from the shortcomings of 
psychiatry in explaining causes of psychopathology by complementing the field with its 
scientific and factual data on the brain. Whether this dualistic view of the mind and brain is 
justified, is a question that is out of the scope of this paper. 
 Returning to Fulford, he seems to have provided conflicting arguments in favor of 
values and psychiatry in general. Irrespective of what the actual proper model of medicine 
should look like, I am of the opinion that he must make several significant revisions in his 
theory to coherently connect the ideas he offers in his book with those in his later works. For 
instance, he must try to balance out his views on the parallelism of facts and values with the 
arguments he makes in support of values complementing facts given his belief that values 
have an inherent capacity at resolving irreconcilable conflicts. In other words, the role of 
values seems to be disproportionately weighed when their interaction with facts is under 
consideration. Fulford must either announce that values have a greater role in medicine than 
that normally assigned to them or come to the realization that they occupy a similar space as 
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facts in our definition of ‘disorder’ and consequently in our understanding and developing 
strategies in diagnosing and treating ‘mental disorders’.  
I tend to agree with Fulford that the significance of values has been historically 
underestimated in medicine but that alone does not make them the ideal candidate for 
reducing the questionable strategies that facts offer in the identification and treatment of 
‘mental disorders’ in general. I also sympathize with him where he tries to contain the range 
of applicability of facts in psychiatry and announces that psychiatry is distinct from the other 
fields of medicine by virtue of its more significant reliance on value considerations; but I do 
not think that that alone should grant him the authority to effectively argue in favor of the 
current understanding of medicine in general. Put differently, I worry that in his account there 
is not a lot of room left for scientific advancements and that to ensure coherence, he must 
take the status quo as what will inevitably persist into the future. This implies that although 
he appears to argue for the possibility of future scientific advancements, his account pushes 
him into restricting the influential range of EBM and consequently, closing avenues that 
allow us to debate whether our understanding of causes of mental disorders should remain the 
same or change over time.  
Furthermore, the superiority of VBM to EBM (although implicit) must either be 
outright rejected or justifiably assumed. I am in favor of a state of equilibrium between facts 
and values and for this reason, I think that he must promote the idea of parallelism between 
EBM and VBM. The feasibility of holding this stance in light of his other arguments is slim. 
However, if he truly plans on defending this view, he must be willing to discuss the 
differences between psychiatry and other fields of medicine in regards to their incorporation 
of VBM and EBM in even further details and also identify and explain what precisely acts as 
the medium of change that makes the divergence between the two forms of medicine possible 
without overturning their credibility. The medium in my opinion is neither a fact nor a value; 
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instead, I think it is the widely-shared norms that exist within all societies. It is important to 
emphasize that by ‘norms’ I have two distinct definitions in mind. Eric Matthews, in his book 
called Body-Subjects and Disordered Minds, defines ‘mental disorders’ as deviations from 
‘human norms’ that are unintelligible to the common human reason; ‘bodily disorders’, on 
the other hand, are equated with deviations from pre-defined ‘biological norms’.228 On the 
same basis, I believe that psychiatry largely depends upon VBM as it must identify and 
evaluate conditions on the basis of the ‘common human norms’ that are at play in any 
particular society. It is not so reliant on EBM given that its objective is to distinguish 
deviations from intelligible reasoning. Other fields of medicine, however, aim at discovering 
deviations from the commonly-shared biological norms or standards which are defined and 
specified on the basis of empirical findings and as such, they are mainly reliant on EBM. 
 Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that a society’s developmental status (in 
regards to scientific and technological advancements) has a significant role in determining 
whether EBM or a mixture of EBM and VBM is to be used in practice. If we imagine an 
underdeveloped society where the resources are scarce, many modes of treatment for, say 
schizophrenia are unavailable. If a schizophrenic patient acts out, he or she will be devalued 
as a person within the society by being deemed criminal, and will be shunned upon by 
everyone including their own family. The same story holds true within the physical realm. In 
the case of someone suffering from infertility, the society may be reluctant to view the person 
as being afflicted with a physical disorder and in the absence of solid scientific knowledge, it 
may consider the person as being sinful and/or not having ‘proper’ faith in God. Given the 
unavailability of treatment and the fact that patients could not be magically cured of their 
illness, the society views the sufferer as an unwanted part of the community since they do not 
fit within their particular socio-cultural understanding of personhood. Not surprisingly, to 
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avoid ending up with more and more of such persons, the society might end up trying to deter 
the afflicted with other means of control such as imposing criminal convictions or religious 
accusations on the basis of their deviant actions (that defy social norms) and the role of the 
afflicted persons within such environments changes from a patient to a criminal or an 
accused. Clearly things would have been different for the above persons had they been living 
in a modernized society like ours. 
As such, VBM could only be ‘properly’ enacted where the society enjoys at least a 
moderate understanding of pathology or psychopathology and to get there, EBM must be in 
existence prior to such enactment. Therefore, if any of the two is to be prioritized, it is the 
EBM and not the VBM that must have precedence. For this reason, EBM must be in 
operation before psychiatry could argue for the discipline’s more evaluative basis. It is 
interesting to ask where this understanding takes us in regards to the field of psychiatry 
particularly since it is heavily reliant on VBM. Far from being at the tip of the medical 
pyramid, psychiatry is so dependent on the very little knowledge it has gained through EBM 
that it cannot be sustained on its own as a purely VBM-based enterprise. Simply put, without 
EBM psychiatry has no future. Therefore, it is crucial that EBM and VBM be used as joint 
partners. 
One of the issues that may arise at this point is regarding the manner in which 
incompatible values are balanced out. Fulford writes extensively on reaching a balance when 
values of patients and service providers are in conflict. Despite this, he does not offer a model 
example in which he puts the idea into practice. Granting that the practice of psychiatry is 
significantly values-based, how could opposing views be coherently understood and 
practiced? There is again the gap resulting from lack of specification of the limits of value 
considerations that is at play. Although Fulford thinks that VBM puts patient-considerations 
first, I am not clear how this could pragmatically be done particularly since there are many 
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patients who lack either an insight into their conditions or the ability to communicate their 
needs. How are we to address such needs while keeping in mind that they supposedly have to 
want the specific need we are about to address, fulfilled? In psychotic disorders, especially 
those with hallucinations, the patients often think that the service providers are not acting in 
their best interests and instead, they frequently believe that clinicians are part of a plot against 
them. In the absence of family members, how can we reasonably assume that what we think 
is right, is indeed the best course of action for such patients? Fulford does not say and I think 
that unless we are willing to introduce and engage an external source of assistance (such as 
the law and legal proceedings) to his account, the subjectively-variable ‘best’ course of action 
for the individuals afflicted cannot be easily determined and even then, there will be no 
guarantees that the chosen option would accord to individuals’ own sense of well-being. 
One might argue that consideration of patients’ values need not accord with pragmatic 
and viable solutions to their problems. If the healthy mind and body is what everyone aims at 
having, then anything that promotes these would implicitly or explicitly accord with patients’ 
goals. I strongly disagree. The therapeutic boundaries are not so clear-cut that we could 
calculate the outcomes beforehand and aim at what is commonly considered as the best 
option. Those views fit within the utilitarian viewpoints and utilitarianism is subject to its 
very own shortcomings and problems. Furthermore, the best course of action for patient A 
might not be identical to that for patient B even if both patients are suffering from the same 
disorder.  
To be clear, I am hesitant to argue for the viability of such arguments and instead 
think that there ought to be a way of evaluating the past decisions of the afflicted persons in 
order to find similar or sufficiently similar (in the sense of being reasonably the same) 
courses of actions and the particular values that the patient in question has previously 
assigned to them. In this sense, I believe that facts come into play. The reason is that the 
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phenomena and the processes that led to particular decisions could only be assessed in light 
of the underlying facts that were significant at that point in time. For instance, if the patient 
has decided to take medications as opposed to ECT (i.e. Electro-Convulsive Therapy) in the 
past when both options were made available to them, then by virtue of similarity of this 
episode of depression to those that occurred in the past, medications are to be used even if the 
patient has lost the ability to communicate their choices and needs to the caregivers. 
It is important to clarify that this method of identifying patients’ needs is by no means 
a problem-free option. While it may rid us of the dilemmas that we would have to face if we 
opt in for the other options, it is nonetheless challenging. The reason is that we must be 
careful enough to avoid placing too much authority (in the decision-making processes) into 
the hands of service providers given that history has proven the susceptibility of this path to 
the promotion of paternalistic forms of therapies and even worse, misuse of power. This is 
where EBM could help. If we decide to accord our values-based considerations to the 
scientifically-proven treatment methods of EBM, then the likelihood of psychiatric misuse 
drops significantly. It is a fact that psychiatry is nowhere near the level of advances made in 
the other medical fields but that should not deter us from engaging as much scientific 
knowledge as is possible and available to us into our diagnosis and treatment modalities. 
Patient advocacy is another means of restricting the opportunity for therapeutic misuse. By 
having an independent advocacy group that functions in the interests of individual patients 
and possibly keeping a track record of their choices and preferences, we might be able to 
incorporate patient needs into decision making processes more fully and completely. The 
decision making power is then divided between two independent sources, one which offers 
treatment and one which proposes the much desired treatment. 
In regards to Fulford’s position on the model of ‘disorder’ and his later references to 
VBM, I think that an inconsistency exists between his original and later views on the concept 
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of ‘values’. One may only coherently understand the difference by distinguishing between the 
two possible senses of the term in question. While in his definition of ‘disorder’ (and on the 
theoretical side of matter), ‘value’ refers to a subjective relationship that one may have in 
relation to the external world, his later works (on the practical side) suggest a differing 
understanding of the concept as the subjective relationship of one to their very own subjective 
and internal sense of existence.229 It may be argued that the non-recognition of this difference 
is the reason behind possible objections. In my opinion, one may rationally find coherence in 
the totality of his works by endorsing this view even though it is subject to its own 
shortcomings. It is worthwhile to note that Fulford does not explicitly or implicitly speak of 
the distinction in the meaning of ‘value’ and one may only assume that he wants the reader to 
come to this conclusion by themselves. 
On the theoretical side, ‘disorder’ is defined as a combination of facts and values 
where the two elements differ in regards to their application to physical and mental disorders. 
While the case of ‘physical disorders’ is more factual and scientific, ‘mental disorders’ are 
more value-laden and normative. The normativity found in the definition of these terms 
corresponds to the external views of society in regards to particular cases of disorders. 
Therefore, while the values shared by both kinds of disorders differ in quantity, they share the 
quality of being normatively defined by the norms of the society at large. As a result, 
‘disorder’ can be defined as the sum of some factual evidence and socio-culturally-defined 
normative values that determine the relation of subjects to their external environment. The 
practical side, on the other hand, considers the values of individual patients and evaluates 
them on the basis of their endorsement by the afflicted persons within VBM and VBP. The 
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practical sense of values, then, considers the relationship of subjects to their own existence as 
experiencing subjects.  
While the two senses of values seem to be jointly forming a comprehensive 
understanding of values in general, they are deeply problematic. The reason is that they cause 
a phenomenological gap in one’s understanding of values when both the theoretical and 
practical senses of values are under consideration. Put differently, it is not obvious how we 
are to shift our attention and make a leap from the socially-defined sense of values to the 
individual’s consideration of them when the aim is to effectively define, diagnose and treat 
‘disorders’. Imagine a person who is diagnosed as having clinical depression. It is not clear 
why we must assume that if their external environment views them as being in need of 
treatment, then the patient must adhere to the social views and reject their subjective 
experiences and values which may be suggestive of a progress made in, say their spiritual 
awareness. This is where the phenomenological gap becomes evident. One may be aware of 
their subjective experiences of their external environment but in the absence of conformity 
between that and their own private and inner subjective experiences it is not obvious which 
must outweigh the other or even how a balanced position, if at all possible, can be reached. 
The problem is particularly acute for those suffering from disorders that have 
anosognosia as their core feature. How are we to convince those persons that the treatment 
offered is their best available option to regain their sense of clarity and to fully enjoy their 
capacity as experiencing subjects? It is far from clear that we could provide them with any 
solid reasons. Another difficulty that may arise is related to the issue of forced treatment. It is 
undeniable that the values and views of patients differ greatly from those of their societies 
and while we reject holding such patients criminally responsible, we routinely subject them to 
forced therapeutic intervention. How can we objectively judge them to be ill when psychiatry 
is so significantly reliant on consideration of values (particularly since we lack any solid 
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evidence that social values are, by virtue of being more commonly shared, more correct 
value-wise)? I do not suppose that there can be a simple answer to this but to avoid 
difficulties in evaluating the role that values play (both at the level of subjective experience 
of the external world and the subjective experience of self) we must define a benchmark 
against which validity of possible views are to be assessed. In other words, in view of the 
complexity of values and the need to objectively assess them and also given that facts 
constitute an inseparable element in the ideology of mental disorders, we must develop a 
benchmark which, in my opinion, is best provided by facts. This is the view that Dominic 
Murphy supports; he contends that neuropsychiatry can provide us with all the necessary 
facts for identifying conditions that are instances of mental disorders. While he recognizes the 
significance of values to the development of mental disorders, he emphasizes that the changes 
that lead to such maladies all arise as a result of the changes that occur in the brain. Simply 
put, the socio-cultural values and forces affect and make changes to the brain and these 
changes in turn modify the patients’ behavior.230 This is a crucial point; given the current 
status of facts (i.e. we do not know what they are in psychiatry), we can perhaps understand 
the predominant position of values in Fulford’s account. However, in conformity with 
Murphy’s ‘biopsychosocial’ approach, I think that facts are the driving force that will help us 
understand and identify instances of mental disorders. I believe that as neuropsychiatry 
advances, we will be better equipped to explain psychopathology and once we learn the facts, 
Fulford would have to revise his account.  
Another related issue is in regards to homosexuality. Fulford rejects the validity of 
arguments in favor of its having a disease status but fails to explain how, under his fact-plus-
value model, we are to treat it as a normal human condition or even a rational choice. The 
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case of homosexuality is distinct in that the values that are involved in its understanding are 
at best not uniform. That is, the disease status of the condition varies from one society to 
another and this is strengthened by Fulford’s account. If the society views it as a form of 
illness, deviant behavior, or even sinful act, the label of the condition varies accordingly. I 
worry that there are too many variables that can affect and promote non-acceptance of the 
condition and the variables constitute differing conceptions of values within societies. This 
essentially reflects the fact that the disease-status of the condition is verified in view of 
external value forces and that the person, their personhood, and particular values play no role. 
The distinction between the two forms of values tends to get exaggerated in the case of 
homosexuality and Fulford’s account seems unable to effectively resolve the issue. 
Sadler’s account is also overtly value-laden. I do feel a need for imposing limitations 
on the influence of values when he allows them to be present in both theory and practice. My 
reservation may become more obvious when inclusion of values as a significant source of 
contribution to theory is considered. Simply put, I am hesitant to accept the idea that given 
our lack of scientific knowledge of the factual causes of psychopathology, we must use 
values in our identification of their causes. Values are not by any means interchangeable with 
facts and where facts are absent we must aim at discovering facts rather than looking for a 
proper substitute. One might claim that psychiatry is in its infancy and that this requirement 
could not be possibly met. I tend to think that just as medical knowledge was expanded 
through time by observation and empirical verification, psychiatry, too, could form 
hypotheses and try to empirically test them. In my opinion, values are best suited to the 
domain of medical practice where decisions have to be made and the values of all parties 
involved must be considered and implemented to the greatest degree possible.  
Regarding the role of values in theory, I assume that these must be limited to 
inclusion of social norms and externally influential phenomena that happen to be restricted to 
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a particular geographic area. An example of such usage is offered by Ian Hacking, who notes 
the numerous cases of the French Fugue which demonstrated a sort of disorder that was 
restricted to France only.231 Values in this sense could be viewed as complementary forces 
that make the factual assumptions comprehensible in particular contexts. Consequently, it 
would be a deeply-rooted confusion to permit values to replace facts where the latter seem to 
be either missing or inadequate. 
Furthermore, Sadler thinks that values are to be allowed to not only participate in, but 
also to influence and modify the nosology.232 This position inevitably introduces a sort of 
relativity in classification and subsequently, diagnosis of mental disorders that cannot be 
eliminated easily. On the positive side, a relativistic nosology can allow us to account for 
region-specific disorders without having to modify the nosology in use. Such relativity, 
however, does not come for free. For one thing, we must be willing to employ a different set 
of classifications in each region and mental disorders would no longer have to be classified 
on the basis of their common symptoms or courses of diseases. Instead, it would be the limits 
of the political boundaries that are used to specify and classify mental disorders. 
Consequently, any changes in the limits of boundaries constitute a reason to develop a new 
nosology that could include the specific maladies of that particular region. While this is the 
least cost we must be willing to pay, there are more costly changes that need to be accounted 
for. For instance, the relativity of diagnoses makes them changeable upon migration of 
individuals from one geographic region to another. Moreover, there will never be a universal 
manual for identification of these disorders which entails that the social forces are the
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decisive factors that can label conditions normal or deviant. Determination of deviance by the 
society makes mental disorders a means of political control and the fact about them 
constituting deviance from socially-accepted norms makes the afflicted a deviant party and 
not a patient. Depending on the society, one can foresee that the deviant population tends to 
get a different sort of treatment than those who are deemed to be ill.  
An example can better demonstrate my point. Under Islamic regimes, homosexuality 
is viewed in two different ways. First, the person is often viewed as suffering from a sort of 
disorder (be it genetic, hormonal, or psychological) or they are seen as being rebellious and 
defiant of the norms already in place. While in the first case, persons are referred to receive 
the relevant treatment (whatever might be deemed relevant in the context of the particular 
society), in the latter case, they are penalized by being detained, imprisoned, or even killed. 
The point is, if we leave enough room for societies to make their own decisions regarding the 
status of what may be broadly called ‘mental disorders’, the ensuing outcome for the 
individuals affected will vary widely. In a society like Canada where homosexuals do not fit 
within either category, the experiencing subjects are viewed as individuals who have 
differing views and as such, they are free to make their own choices and live life according to 
their utmost desires.  
Although homosexuality is an extreme and controversial example, I believe that it can 
teach us a number of things. First, we must avoid leaving decisions in the hands of 
authoritarian regimes. Second, we must aim at limiting the decisions to the boundaries of 
medicine and not allowing social norms to dictate the status of conditions. Third, we must 
aim at taking relativistic considerations out of our nosology in order to move towards a more 
universal catalogue of psychopathology. Fourth, mental disorders might be better identified 
in the nosology by virtue of the facts already available and values must exist in the 
background as factors that can effectively complement facts. Finally, values must be present 
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in the context of medical practice where the individual values differ and must act as a means 
of reaching a balanced consideration of values of all affected by the decisions. 
Overall, in accordance with both Fulford and Sadler, I believe that values have a 
crucial role in developing a proper understanding of psychopathology but that does not entail 
their inclusion at the expense of excluding facts. Fulford has a very promising account for the 
enactment of values in psychiatry but his account is also in need of some serious 
modifications in order to coherently fit and accord with the rest of his arguments. It is 
undeniable that at our current place, facts have a very minimal role in explaining mental 
disorders but their inadequacy must not be translated into the impossibility of ever attaining 
more solid knowledge. Psychiatry may not reach the level of scientific advancement that we 
will be witness to in other fields of medicine in general in the next twenty years but the 
likelihood of making progress is still great. Furthermore, Fulford proposes the idea of 
incorporating values alongside facts in what he labels as VBM and EBM. I think that the 
interaction between the two areas can take us much further than ever, particularly since up 
until recent years values have been likened to the practical norms of societies and for that 
reason, we have neglected their crucial role in the practical realm. Once we agree that they 
form a crucial part in developing a definition and incorporating the causation, identification, 
and treatment of mental disorders, we would be in a better position to argue for their 
inclusion beyond psychiatry and in other medical disciplines. 
It is important to emphasize that I am not proposing a model under which values 
would play the main role and facts are sparingly spread to complement them. Given the fact 
that mental disorders must originate in the brain (I cannot imagine any other human organ to 
have a role in our development of mind and mental disorders), facts inevitably must lead the 
way both in our nosology and diagnosis. Values, by the same token, become influential in 
selection and application of treatment methods and are determinate factors in evaluating the 
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appropriateness of clinical practice and in distinguishing ethical from non-ethical practices. 
This entails that while facts and values are inseparable elements in understanding ‘disorders’ 
in general and ‘mental disorders’ in particular, each nonetheless provides the benchmark 
against which assessments of efficiency are made. Facts are determinant in theory and values 
are the dominant force behind practical considerations. This division can be properly made 
once we neutralize our tendency to engage values (more than facts) within the totality of the 
medical sphere. 
Sadler has argued that ‘values’, as the key to a proper understanding of mental 
disorders, must be included in the nosology, diagnosis, and decision making processes. I hold 
the same viewpoint except that their application in the differing areas must be closely 
monitored. Where factual data are dominant, values must play a small role, if any. Even in 
cases where values seem to precede, I believe that their imposition must be in consideration 
of the role that facts play. Whether I am imposing a too narrow approach is something I am 
willing to defend. My reason is that by allowing values to take part in all the areas without 
defining pre-set limits, we are leaving the door open for the possibility of values overtaking 
facts even where the latter seem to be dominant. My worry is in this sense similar to that of 
Kendell where he held that broadening the definition any further would provide the necessary 
space for implementing abuse in psychiatry. I am reluctant to accept that without any set 
boundaries values would be contained if not by facts then by external socio-cultural forces. 
For one thing, facts currently occupy quite a small space in psychiatry and values, given their 
free reign and their variable nature in accordance to the context considered, could be 
disguised as an independent entity capable of causing alterations in our understanding. As a 
result, granting values a loosely-restricted sphere of influence automatically introduces abuse 
(whether in regards to the stigma present in the clinical settings of psychiatry or in respect to 
the political dissidents refusing to adhere to injustice). Therefore, it is rationally-sound to be 
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hesitant to grant values the opportunity to be involved in and influence the many aspects of 
psychiatry.  
In the end, I am uncertain as to whether we would be able to come up with a more 
pragmatic model for understanding psychopathology than the one Fulford and Sadler have 
offered. While we must not close our options by limiting our choices to the models that they 
have developed, I think that we must aim at incorporating them in the clinical contexts and it 
is only then that matters related to better and more ethical clinical practice could be 
effectively addressed. Therefore, even though their models are flawed unless changes are 
made to them, I contend that they provide us with the most feasible and best available option 
yet. Once the fact-plus-value model is introduced into clinics, the other potential problems 
that it may implicitly have (which could not be identified in isolation from the context) would 
become visible. Hence, on the whole, I defend the introduction and incorporation of this 
model into the medical practice of psychiatry. 
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